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APPROVED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE: 
This paper is a comparative analysis of U.S. foreign 
policy towards Iran and the Philippines. The question which 
prompted this research topic was simple: why was the outcome 
for the United States so different in terms of subsequent 
relations with each state after the downfall of the Shah and 
Ferdinand Marcos? Both leaders were important U.S. allies in 
strategic states that had benefitted from foreign aid. 
Opposition groups in each state resented this support of 
their repressive leaders. Unlike Iran, good relations with 
the Philippines continued during the Aquino presidency, 
without the resentment and mistrust which prevented good 
relations after the Shah's departure. 
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In order to explore this question, the U.S. 
relationship with each state is divided into an examination 
of two time periods. The tenure period encompasses the point 
from which each leader assumed power until the start of the 
events which ultimately led to the end of their regimes. For 
the Shah, this was from the 1953 coup overthrowing Mossadeq 
until to the visit from President Carter in 1978. For 
President Marcos, this was from the Presidential election of 
1969 to the assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983. The 
crisis period begins from the end of the tenure periods to 
the departure of each leader. For the Shah this was November 
4, 1979; for President Marcos, February 24, 1986. 
While the crisis period comparison relies primarily on 
an examination of events, the tenure period uses a framework 
developed by Barry Goldstone in an essay entitled 
"Revolutions and Superpowers." Goldstone asserts that in 
modern neopatrimonial regimes such as Iran and the 
Philippines, dictators centralize power around themselves in 
patronage networks, and use foreign aid to support their 
regimes. The assertion is that foreign aid is used by the 
United States to augment the resources of these regimes, in 
order to maintain leaders which are sympathetic to U.S. 
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interests. Ultimately, these leaders rely too much on U.S. 
support, and fail to develop the mass support needed to 
maintain their regimes. Leaders become over identified with 
United States, being perceived as relying on U.S. support to 
maintain their positions. This framework provides a way in 
which to compare different states using a consistent 
measuring stick in terms of U.S. foreign policy and regime 
failure. 
The use of two time periods is augmented by a 
comparison of four additional elements: the historical 
relationship with the United States, the U.S. presence in 
each country, the pressure role of religion in politics, and 
the role of miliary training provided by U.S. personnel. 
They were chosen because they seemed to provide important 
points of comparison, which might prove to be crucial 
differences in how each state related to the United States 
during each regime. 
The analysis concludes that the timing of foreign aid 
was more important than long-term U.S. support of each 
leader. Marcos and the Shah became over identified with the 
United States because support was given during a period of 
regime consolidation. However, the legacy of the long-term 
relationship with the U.S., in terms of tolerance for U.S. 
influence in Philippine affairs moderated the response of 
the Aquino regime. Also, there was little understanding 
regarding the nature of the Iranian revolution and radical 
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position of Khomeini's followers. In both states, the 
relationship created during the tenure period affected the 
range of choices that policy makers were aware of during the 
final crisis, and the amount of leverage that the United 
States could use successfully. 
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The United states has confronted a dilemma in its long-
term relationships with authoritarian Third World states. 
support for authoritarian regimes may benefit the United 
States in the short-term, ensuring access to trade and the 
maintenance of a non-communist regime in addition to 
security considerations. However, 
the United States becomes the 
when these regimes fall, 
scapegoat of the new 
government, blamed for supporting a corrupt and repressive 
rule which sacrificed the interests of the citizenry. As a 
result, the United States finds itself unable to effectively 
pursue a satisfactory relationship with the new government. 
These forfeitures are especially important when they involve 
states of strategic importance. While occasional losses 
cause immediate difficulties, a series of them damages the 
prestige of the United States as a superpower. This pattern 
of supporting repressive regimes, which are replaced by non-
friendly regimes has been evident from Vietnam to Iran, El 
Salvador, and Nicaragua. 
Long-term support, outside of active intervention by the 
CIA, has involved official transfers of large amounts of 
military and financial aid for three purposes. First, it is 
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in U.S. interests to keep these friendly authoritarian 
regimes stable, since they pursue military and economic 
policies that are perceived to benefit U.S. interests. 
Financial and military support can fill in the capability 
gaps resulting from a lack of resources; such gaps can 
weaken a leader's power, leading to instability. Second, 
these regimes are in de facto control of the states they 
govern, in the sense that these authoritarian leaders have 
initially created and maintained their own power bases. 
Despite charges by opposition groups that united states' 
support keeps these regimes alive far past their natural 
political lives, the United States cannot create an 
authoritarian leader who manages that support to ensure his 
political longevity. 
Finally, the strategy of containing communism has 
proved to be an 
and the U.S. 
overriding concern for U.S. 
has taken the position that 
policy makers, 
authoritarian 
dictators are preferable to communist regimes. It can be 
argued that U.S. policy makers perceived the Cold War world 
in zero-sum terms; the loss of an ally meant a gain for the 
u.s.s.R. In addition, support could be justified because 
Third World states were perceived to be in a pre-modern 
stage; modern economic development would lead to political 
development. Democracy would prevail, with enough economic 
support and protection from communist influences, as a 
result of the modernization process. 
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Another aspect of this support involves the United 
States changing perception of commitment, and the relative 
balance of bargaining power. Many of these relationships 
began when the weaker parties were unable to effectively 
exploit their importance to U.S. interests. However, as the 
relationship progressed, two things occurred. The 
authoritarian leader became more aware of the state's 
importance to u.s. interests and better able to negotiate 
with U.S. policy makers. Second, U.S. policy makers 
developed a familiarity with a particular leader; the 
pattern of the relationship became a known and calculable 
quantity, enabling policy makers to better calculate current 
and future support for U.S. interests. 
THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Given these factors, is there any way to avoid the 
dilemma of short-term support incurring long-term costs? To 
explore the question, this paper will execute a comparative 
analysis of U.S. intervention and influence in Iran during 
the reign of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, and in the 
Philippines during the rule of President Ferdinand Marcos. 
When the Shah fell from power, the United States was forced 
to terminate diplomatic relations with Iran after the 
hostage crisis, and was unable to negotiate any successful 
relationship with the successive regimes. The United States 
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was blamed by the opposition for keeping the Shah in power, 
and accorded responsibility for training s.A.V.A.K., the 
Shah's secret police. In the Philippines, the United states 
maintained good relations with the new Aquino government, 
despite the fact that the United states was blamed by the 
opposition for keeping Marcos in power through large amounts 
of military and financial aid. 
There are two central questions. First, did 
differences in U.S. actions before or during the crisis 
provide a better explanation of these opposite outcomes? 
Second, was the outcome determined by an accumulation of 
cultural, religious or historical factors that made it 
difficult to mitigate the opposition to the United states? 
THE CASE FOR COMPARABILITY 
In terms of comparability, these states appear to have 
very little in common. First, each has a distinct culture, 
religious orientation, and traditions. The Philippines was a 
former colony while Iran was not, although both experienced 
occupation during World War II, albeit by different sides in 
the conflict. Also, the Middle East and South Pacific are 
very different geopolitical spheres. Iran was a far more 
powerful state, economically and militarily, and dominated 
the region for these reasons. The Shah actively pursued the 
role of regional leader for Iran. The Philippines, on the 
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other hand, had been continuously engaged in a long running 
battle against different Communist insurgent groups, and 
continued to host two large United States military bases. 
It had no plans to be a regional leader, except in terms of 
being the leading regional u.s. ally. 
However, both states have important similarities in 
terms of their relationship with the United states. First, 
Iran and the Philippines are strategically important. The 
Philippines' geographic location is ideal for the presence 
of Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Field, which would cost 
the United States millions to recreate elsewhere. Iran was 
initially important because of its border with the Soviet 
Union, and it was perceived as vulnerable to Soviet 
infiltration. Iran's importance evolved as it became a 
regional leader in the Middle East where it supported United 
States' interests. Iran became an exporter of large amounts 
of oil to the United States, and the Shah was leader in OPEC 
where the United States badly needed representation. 
Second, each state was ruled by authoritarian leaders 
whose regimes were marked by corruption, repression, and a 
continuing lack of development. While both the Shah and 
Marcos promised economic and political reform, the reality 
was that little happened in terms of wealth redistribution 
or power sharing for the masses. Systems of corruption and 
patronage prevailed, and were reinforced. Also, both leaders 
spent large amounts of money on developing their military 
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forces at the expense of domestic expenditure; each made up 
the short-fall in different ways, but the economy suffered. 
The rationale for the military build-up in the Philippines 
was on counter-insurgency, while the purported focus in Iran 
was on outside threats from states like Iraq. However, both 
the Shah and Ferdinand Marcos relied on the military as part 
of their power base. Each state devoted at least 15\ of the 
state budget towards military development towards the end of 
their regimes at the expense of social investments such as 
housing and education. 
Third, U.S. perception of these states is arguably 
very similar, particularly given a Cold War foreign policy. 
During the relevant time period, it can be argued that a 
bipolar zero-sum situation existed. In effect, loss of an 
ally meant a gain for the other side, even if there was no 
official alliance with the u.s.s.R. following the fall of a 
pro-u.s. regime. A high U.S. priority was the maintenance 
and cultivation of non-communist allies. Later the loss was 
more critical in terms of strategic and economic interests, 
rather than the zero-sum, Cold War calculus. In terms of the 
Philippines, the loss of the Clark and subic Bay military 
bases would have been irreplaceable, particularly after the 
Soviet Union established naval operations in cam Ranh Bay in 
Vietnam. In terms of Iran, the loss of a friendly, powerful 
ally in the Middle East that was also powerful within OPEC 
introduced another type of uncertainty into Middle East 
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relations, and pushed the United states to more strongly in 
accordance with other anti-Israeli allies. 
While some of the comparability rests on the 
similarities between developing states and authoritarian 
rulers, the focus of this study is the similarities and 
differences in U.S. treatment of each regime. Both states 
believed that they participated in a "special relationship" 
with the United States, while the United States pursued the 
most advantageous course according to Cold War dictates, as 
well as strategic and economic interests. 
THE RESEARCH METHOD 
The analysis will examine two time periods. The 
first encompasses the time in off ice of each leader up to 
the point when the crisis began. The second encompasses the 
\ 
period of crisis up until the point where the new government 
is installed, or diplomatic relations end. Hereafter they 
will be referred to as the tenure period and the crisis 
period. The reason for examining these two time periods is 
to determine whether something in the u.s. relationship 
during the tenure period or the crisis period provides a 
better explanation of the eventual outcome. 
In the case of Iran, the tenure period begins with the 
restoration of the Shah to power August, 1953 to the state 
visit of President Carter January 1, 1978. The crisis period 
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begins with the demonstrations in the holy city of Qom, 
January 7, 1978 and concludes January 16, 1979 with the 
departure of the Shah. The extended period of unrest prior 
to taking the hostages on November 04, 1979, ls also briefly 
discussed, in order to demonstrate that the Ayatollah 
Khomeini actually mobilized the citizenry, including the 
bureaucracy. 
the scope and 
important in 
relations. 
The slow realization by U.S. policy makers of 
nature of the revolution may have been 
terms of lost opportunities for better 
For the Philippines, the tenure period begins with the 
election of Marcos to the presidency on November 9, 1969 and 
ends prior to the Aquino assassination. The crisis period 
begins with the assassination of Benigno Aquino on August 
22, 1983, and ends with the departure of Ferdinand Marcos to 
Hawaii on February 24, 1986. Although the crisis time period 
is much longer, the events are no less dramatic than the 
year of violence preceding the Shah's departure. 
The problem in examining the tenure period involves 
doing a comparison of the u.s. relationship with the two 
states that ensures the same perspective will be used to 
examine U.S. relations with each state. This analysis makes 
the assumption that each state fell within the same class 
from the U.S. perspective: countries that were strategically 
as well as symbolically important in the context of the Cold 
War, were led by authoritarian regimes supported by the 
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United States, and experienced rapid dissolution. The 
examination of the tenure period relies on a framework 
developed by Jack Goldstone, in an essay entitled 
"Revolutions and Superpowers."l The Goldstone framework 
provides a way to look at how foreign aid works as a type of 
U.S. intervention into Third World states. 
Goldstone describes the characteristics of modern 
neopatrimonial regimes, including in this category both Iran 
and the Philippines. Neopatrimonial regimes are 
characterized by elite and urban based support, rather than 
the mass support of the population. While they may have 
democratic forms such as congresses and parliaments, 
political power is actually restricted to a small elite 
group. There are four highly active elite segments: 
traditional oligarchs, new professionals, and the military 
and bureaucratic elites. A central chief executive acts as 
a power broker among these different groups. Furthermore, 
this chief executive depends primarily on a system of 
personal patronage and coercion to maintain state authority. 
While the state may have legislatures and political parties, 
real power is wielded by the central dictator. 
However, in acting as the central power broker among 
these different groups, the chief executive needs to 
dispense resources valued by the elite groups. These are 
1 In Superpowers and Revolutions (Ed) Jonathan Adelman, 
(Praeger Publishers) 1986. 
chiefly money (the 
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administration of such projects, for 
ways in which a leader's resources 
example). One of the 
can be augmented ls 
asserts that the U.S. through foreign aid. Goldstone 
encourages overreliance on foreign aid; because the U.S. 
gives such massive amounts, the need for the executive to 
build a non-elite support base is eliminated. 
In addition, the U.S. may demand certain quid pro quos 
for their money which antagonize the nationalist feelings of 
elite groups. Reliance on foreign aid can also lead to the 
perception that the chief executive is vulnerable because 
his only support is from the United States; he loses 
legitimacy through overldentificatlon with a foreign power. 
Finally, if economic growth falters, he may lose donor 
support at the same time he ls unable to provide fuel for 
the patronage machine which is his means of support. Thus 
economic and military aid can be particularly important in 
the political life of these leaders, and in the political 
aftermath for the United States. 
In using this framework to analyze U.S. policy, the 
first question is whether the Shah and Marcos relied on 
foreign aid to maintain their regimes. The other aspect to 
this question is whether the opposition perceived this to be 
the case, thus affecting their desire to maintain relations 
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on the same terms with the United States once the old regime 
had fallen. Also, did the United States demand onerous quid 
pro quos that antagonized opposition groups? If so, this 
may have changed over time, as each regime was better able 
to exploit its strategic and symbolic value to the United 
States. 
The final question is whether the amount and type of 
U.S. aid provided allowed these leaders to avoid fiscal 
responsibility, to such an extent that they destroyed their 
legitimacy. When the economic downturn occurred, as it did 
for both states, there was nothing to fall back on. In 
addition, pressure from new classes, a power shift from one 
group to another, or dissatisfaction with the repressive 
regime, may have been more important in the eventual 
downfall of each leader, and the new government's opposition 
to the United States. 
In addition to this framework, I propose to also look 
at some other factors. These include: 
-historical relationship with the United States 
-U.S. presence in the country 
-the pressure role of religion in politics 
-the role of military training provided by U.S. 
personnel 
These factors may be important in terms of how the United 
states was perceived by the public and opposition groups in 
each country. For example, S.A.V.A.K., the Shah's secret 
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police, had benefitted from C.I.A. training, and the United 
States was widely blamed by Iranians for its creation and 
brutality. In the Philippines, there was a lot of 
resentment against the squalor and prostitution that 
surrounded the U.S. military bases. In addition, the base 
agreements created an extraterritoriality which was widely 
resented by many Filipinos. 
The second part of the analysis concerns events during 
the period of crisis and regime change. It is important to 
look at what the U.S. response was to regime breakdown and 
whether the U.S. sought to preserve the status quo of the 
old regime or encouraged the establishment of the new 
regime. The method of comparison will involve an examination 
of the historical record of events, which encompasses visits 
made by special envoys, State Department officials, embassy 
reports and Presidential responses. In addition, the survey 
of statements made by those groups of individuals which 
assumed power during the regime change is a record of their 
perceptions of the United States and its role in supporting 
the departing leader or the new regime. Such perceptions of 
support may have significantly influenced the future course 
of relations. 
In order to understand the context in which the United 
States began to provide military and economic assistance on 
a large-scale basis after World War II, the following brief 
historical account describes the perceived uses and perils 
-./ 
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of foreign aid transfers for the United States. The 
discussion focuses primarily on economic aid, since the 
security nature of military aid, and its role in containing 
counter-insurgency are fairly obvious. 
REVIEW OF U.S. FOREIGN AID 
The United States has always had a security orientation 
towards their aid programs. While this is obvious with 
military assistance programs, it is not as readily apparent 
with economic aid. The United states has long supported 
allies with economic as well as military assistance, 
nominally for development purposes. Economic assistance was 
supposed to promote U.S. security because economically 
strong and politically cohesive states were less likely to 
be vulnerable to subversion or external intervention. 2 T h e 
concerns about intervention began after World War II. Post 
war U.S. aid began with the Greek-Turkish aid program of 
1947. The aid proposal was in response to the United 
Kingdom's inability to support the Greek government's fight 
against guerrillas believed to be supported by communist 
satellite states. 3 Aid was also given to Turkey for the 
2 Joan Nelson, Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy (New 
York: Macmillan and Company, 1968), p. 13. 
3 Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third 
World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 27. 
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same purposes. 4 This aid package was the beginning of a 
policy which, in Truman's words, stated his belief that " we 
must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in 
their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily 
through economic and financial aid which is essential to 
economic stability and orderly political processes. 115 
In keeping with this belief, the Truman administration 
authorized the second major foreign aid program, the 
European Recovery Program, otherwise known as the Marshall 
Plan. It remains the most successful foreign aid program in 
history. $17 billion dollars was appropriated in Congress 
for the European Recovery Act in March of 1948. By 1952, $4 
billion dollars under budget, almost all of the goals had 
been achieved. 6 Much of the Marshall Plan's success, 
however, can be attributed to the fact that economic aid was 
being given to states which already possessed the 
sophisticated economic systems and the technical expertise 
to rebuild them. 7 
The need for the Marshall plan, as well as increases in 
the foreign aid program, arose from the failure of post-war 
4 David A. Baldwin, Foreign Aid and American Foreign 
Policy a Documentary Analysis (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, Publishers, 1966), p. 23. 
5 Packenham, Liberal America, p. 26. 
6 Packenham, Liberal America, p. 34. 
7 Hans Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the United 
States (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 95. 
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institutions such as the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (I BRD), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the International Trade 
Organization (ITO), and also of private investment to 
provide the capital for rebuilding war ravaged economies. 
Eastern Europe had already been dominated by the Soviet 
Union; since most Western European states already had 
communist parties, U.S. policy makers believed it was vital 
that economic stability and prosperity be restored to 
prevent further Communist gains and Soviet hegemony in 
Europe. 8 Hans Morgenthau identifies the fifteen weeks in the 
spring of 1947 to the armistice of the Korean War as a phase 
of realization and adaption by U.S. policy makers to an 
expansionist Soviet Union. 9 The Marshall Plan was part of 
this response to the perception that the "political health 
in Europe depended on economic medicine." 10 
The views of U.S. policy makers regarding the Marshall 
Plan have been explored by Gilbert Winham in a content 
analysis of speeches by fourteen key policy makers involved 
8 Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World, p. 
33-34. 
9 Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the United 
States, p. 84. 
lOPackenham, p. 34. 
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in creating and advocating the Marshall Plan. 11 His research 
confirms that economic considerations were most important to 
these decision makers. World economic health was perceived 
as of prime importance, and this could only be done with an 
economically healthy Europe. After this, the national 
interest was the most common theme to emerge; security 
considerations in terms of invasion or war with the U.S.S.R. 
became important after the Communist takeover in 
Czechoslovakia in February of 1948. Humanitarian 
considerations rate last as an important reason to extend 
economic assistance. 
During his inaugural address of 1949, Truman outlined 
the rationale for his enlargement of the financial aid 
program with the Point Four Proposal. In points three and 
four, Truman discusses the arrangements that had been made 
to "provide unmistakable proof of the joint determination of 
the free countries to resist armed attack from any 
quarter" 12, referring to the Rio Pact and the soon to be 
finalized NATO agreement. This was the beginning of a web of 
treaties, designed to thwart Soviet aggression through 
11 Gilbert R. Winham, "Developing Theories of Foreign 
Policy Making: A Case Study of Foreign Aid" Journal of 
Politics, 32(1) (February, 1970) 41-70. 
60. 
12 Baldwin, Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy, p. 
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physical encirclement. 13 Truman also made explicit the U.S. 
planned to provide military advice and equipment to "free 
nations which will cooperate with us in the maintenance of 
peace and security"14. Truman also made an explicit U.S. 
goal to create a new program to assist the less developed 
states, referring to the poverty that existed in much of the 
world. Truman's thesis was that democracy could only 
flourish where people had hope of a better life. He stated 
that 
Democracy alone can supply the vitalizing force to 
stir the peoples of the world into triumphant 
action, not only against their human oppressors, 
but also against tneir ancient enemies---hunger, 
misery, and despair . 
The important aspect of Truman's Point Four is his 
linkage between peace, democracy and economic prosperity. 
The belief that the provision of U.S. foreign aid, with a 
strong reliance on technical assistance would reduce 
poverty, thereby reducing the appeal of communism would be 
more distinctly expressed as the Truman presidency 
progressed. The appropriation in 1950 for all foreign aid 
13 Besides the Rio Pact and NATO, the United states was 
a signatory of ANZUS in 1951, and SEATO, 1954, and also the 
reconfiguration of the Baghdad Pact into CENTO, 1959. 
14Baldwin, Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy, p. 
61. 
15Baldwin, Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy, p. 
62. 
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was a modest $34.5 million.16 The amount was increased to 
$155.6 million by 1953; although this was negligible 
compared to the defense budget 17, it does indicate a 
reliance on development to cure potential political 
problems. Economic development would provide an ounce of 
economic prevention as an antidote for the appeal of 
communism. 
In the 1950s, aid to underdeveloped nations continued 
as a security measure. Truman's Secretary of State, Dean 
Acheson, in a report to the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations in 1950, made even more explicit the security 
orientation of foreign aid. Acheson specifically links the 
economic security of the Third World and U.S. security. 
Increasing numbers of people no longer accept 
poverty as an inevitable fact of life. They are 
becoming aware of the gap between their living 
standards and those in the more highly developed 
countries. They are looking for a way out of 
their misery. They are not concerned with abstract 
ideas of democracy or communism. They are 
interested in practical solutions to their 
problems in terms of food, shelter, and a decent 
livelihood. When the Communists offer quick and 
easy remedies for all their 
18
ills, they make a 
strong appeal to these people. 
16 Thomas A. Bailey, 
American People (New York: 
805. 
A Diplomatic History of the 
Apple-Century-Crofts, 1964), p. 
17 Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the 
American People, p. 805. 
64. 
11 Baldwin, Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy, p. 
19 
He continues on that the appropriations for foreign aid are 
"in a very real sense .•• a security measure"u. While 
foreign aid amounts were not large compared to the 1960s, 
much of the aid to Southeastern Asia and Latin America 
continued to be justified in this fashion. 
Essentially, the Eisenhower administration didn't 
differ in its perception of what economic aid could 
accomplish, however, it reversed the ratio of economic to 
military aid. Instead of a ratio of four economic aid 
dollars to every one military aid dollar, the amount of 
military aid was on average twice the amount of economic aid 
for the remainder of the decade 28 . The Mutual Security Act 
of 1951 created and governed three agencies: the Technical 
Cooperation Administration, the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Program and the Economic Cooperation Administration. The 
activities of these three agencies provided mutual security 
by ensuring military as well as economic advancement to 
"friendly countries".21 The Foreign Operations 
Administration was created in 1953; direct military aid 
constituted seventy percent of the budget, while twenty 
percent was defense support.22 The idea was to create a 
64. 
19 Baldwin, Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy, p. 
28 Packenham, Liberal America, p.49. 
21 Packenham, Liberal America, p. 50. 
22 w.w. Rostow, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Foreign Aid 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), p. 91. 
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periphery beyond which the Soviet Union communism would not 
venture, as it did in the Korean War. 23 It was abolished 
two years later, and responsibility was subsumed within the 
State Department.24 
With the Kennedy administration, a number of 
significant changes occurred in the foreign aid program. A 
much greater emphasis was put on economic aid. The Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 replaced the Mutual Security Act as 
the fundamental legislation which governed aid programs. 25 
The goal was to make assistance into a coordinated program 
for each country that involved technical, capital and 
commodity assistance.26 Countries needed to modernize in 
terms of their entire social structure and way of life, in 
order to enable them to reach the "take-off" into self-
sustaining growth. 27 It was in the United States best 
interests to increase the pace of development. A nation 
absorbed in internal political development would be less 
likely to look for external scapegoats, and was less likely 
to fall prey to internal subversion or external 
23 Rostow, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Foreign Aid, p. 91. 
24 R.D. Mckinlay and A. Mughan, Aid and Arms in the 
Third World ( New York: st. Martin's Press, 1984), p.34. 
25Packenham, Liberal America, p.60. 
26 Packenham, Liberal America, p.62. 
27 Packenham, Liberal America, p.62. 
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intervention. 28 Also, growing wealth offered a greater 
opportunity for trade and investment.29 
During Johnson's Presidency, the priorities of the aid 
program differed in two aspects. Like the Kennedy 
administration, AID pursued the same goals: self-help, the 
coordination of aid programs within a state to receive the 
maximum benefit, incentives for private investment, and 
loans rather than grants. 30 However, Johnson was willing to 
use the withdrawal of aid as a stick to threaten those 
states which pursued policies counter to U.S. interests. 31 
The second difference was in Congress' growing interest 
in political development issues. With the Title IX 
amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, Congress 
specifically charged AID with strengthening organizations 
such as labor unions, community action groups, and other 
voluntary organizations, and involving them in development 
projects. It was an attempt to use aid to build "democratic 
institutions," or in other words, to use foreign aid to 
influence internal politics in terms of promoting power 
redistribution and democratic development.32 However, it 
28 Joan Nelson, Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 13. 
29 Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy, p.13. 
JO Packenham, Liberal America, p. 86. 
31 Packenham, Liberal America, p. 89. 
32 Packenham, Liberal Ameri~a 1 p.100. 
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had very little effect on actual AID policy. 33 
The Nixon/Kissinger years emphasized disengaging the 
United States from foreign entanglements, in an effort to 
relinquish the roles which were perceived as detrimental to 
U.S. interests. The approach was pragmatic instead of 
ideological, and stressed the need to share burdens with 
other states. Economic aid was increasingly given through 
multilateral institutions.34 Military aid was used as a 
support and reward for allies, as in the case of Iran where 
the Shah was given a carte blanche for arms purchases. 
Economic aid from AID had been increasingly given to 
Vietnam in support of displaced peasants and general support 
of military strategy. This continued until the U.S. 
negotiated its withdrawal from Vietnam, but it severely 
affected the AID program. As AID funds were used for war 
support in the name of development, a "credibility gap" 
emerged. In 1973, the Foreign Assistance Act was passed 
into law. AID as an agency remained intact; however, it was 
severely restricted by Congress, which required two detailed 
budgets per year and exercised a line-item veto over 
33 Packenham, Liberal America, p. 107. 
34 James Howe and Robert Hunter, United States Aid 
Performance and Development Policy" in Aid Performance and 
Development in Western Countries: Studies in U.S., U.K., 
E.E.C. and Dutch Programs, (Ed.) Bruce Dinwald, (New York: 
Praeger, 1973) p60. 
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expend! tures. 35 
The Foreign Assistance Act mandated a basic needs 
strategy, at the expense of developmental programs that 
involved a state-wide planning effort. Eberstadt charges 
that AID money was increasingly given to local leaders 
without any oversight, allowing them to use the money for 
whatever they wished. 36 However, at the same time, the 
amount of aid money given bilaterally had already started to 
decrease. There was a realization, that U.S. aid had not 
achieved several of its goals, such as preventing communist 
takeover, promoting democracy, decreasing the gap between 
the less developed countries (LDCs) and the First World, or 
buying influence over the long term. 37 Instead, economic 
development had created even greater discontent as societies 
mobilized with better health and more education, but no 
concomitant economic improvement for the majority of 
individuals. 
After the 1973 oil price increases, developing 
states relied increasingly on private commercial banks to 
l5Nicholas Eberstadt, Foreign Aid and American Purpose 
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, 1988), pp. 34-36. 
36 Nicholas Eberstadt, Foreign Aid and American Purpose 
(Washington, o.c.: American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, 1988), pp. 38. 
37 James Howe and Robert Hunter, 'United States Aid 
Performance and Development Policy" in Aid Performance and 
Development in Western Countries Studies in the U.S., U.K., 
E.E.C. and Dutch Programs edited by Bruce Dinwiddy (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), pp. 65-66. 
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provide loans to cover deficits generated by high oil 
prices. 31 It was also in response to a contraction in 
economic assistance by other governments in terms of 
development aid.39 The perception of U.S. banks and other 
investors was that governments were a good loan risk because 
it was impossible for them to default on loans in the 
accepted sense. States like the Philippines started took the 
initial steps towards a spiralling problem of borrowing more 
to finance larger debts, which would need to be financed by 
more borrowing. The world recession slowed down economic 
growth as developed states imported less, effecting the 
economies of less developed states. By the time of the 
second oil shock of 1979, the world had sustained several 
years of world economic recession. States were extremely 
reliant on foreign loans, despite the reality of increasing 
interest payments, and extremely large debt amounts.ti 
When the debt crisis became apparent 1982, the U.S. 
assisted in two ways. First, the Federal Reserve put a lot 
31 Catherine Gwin, "The I.H.F. and the World Bank: 
Measures to Improve the System" in Uncertain Future: 
Commercial Banks and the Third World, edited by Richard 
Feinberg and Valeriana Kallab (New Brunswick: overseas 
Development Council, 1984), p. 112. 
"Gwin, "The !.H.F. and the World Bank: Measures to 
Improve the System" in Uncertain Future: Commercial Banks 
and the Third World, p. 89. 
40 Benjamin J. Cohen, "High Finance, High Politics" in 
Uncertain Future: Commercial Banks and the Third World, 
edited by Richard Feinberg and Valeriana Kallab (New 
Brunswick: overseas Development Council, 1984), p. 112. 
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of pressure on U.S. lenders to keep lending, in order to 
finance the already large debt. At the same time, 
governments were subject to austerity measures imposed by 
the lenders. Initially grateful for short term loan 
assistance, Latin American states in particular increasingly 
viewed austerity measures as the cause of "retarded 
development, increased unemployment, and declining living 
standards" as well as increased political instability. 41 
The other change was that large amounts of loans to 
finance these debts were to be made through the IMF. The 
United States used the IMF as a front. U.S. bilateral 
demands for domestic economic reform were increasingly met 
with hostility. The U.S. put strong pressure on the IMF to 
increase the amount of Special Drawing Rights moneys 
available 42 . In February of 1983, SDRs went from 61 billion 
to 90 billion. The IMF, being a multilateral institution, 
could impose austerity measures without the political 
backlash and charges of interventionism that would be hurled 
at the United States by political opposition groups and 
governments within the recipient states. Cohen states that 
"Any effort to impose unpopular policy conditions on 
troubled debtors would undoubtedly have fanned the flames of 
41 cohen, "High Politics, High Finance", p. 116. 
42 Special Drawing Rights or SDRs are moneys available 
to lenders on a short-term basis when they have reached 
their limit of IMF funds available to them, but have a 
continuing need for money. 
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nationalism, if not revolution, in many countries."43 
ECONOMIC POLITICS/POLITICAL REALITIES 
The transfer of large amounts of foreign aid from 
richer to poorer nations, is a relatively recent phenomenon. 
After World War II and the widespread and rapid 
decolonization of much of the world, it became evident that 
newborn states would not be able to attain economic growth 
either quickly or easily. In the 1950s economists began to 
approach the problem of speeding up economic development, 
and the ways and means to accomplishing this end. 
Walt Rostow was the first to create an economic theory 
of development, one in which foreign aid occupied a specific 
function in developing economies. He made a number of 
important judgements about what "developed" and 
"underdeveloped" constituted in terms of the world economy 
as a whole. U These judgements inf or med the debates 
surrounding both political and economic relationships to the 
Third World. He created a yardstick by which to measure a 
state's position and progress. Governments in both donor and 
recipient states would need to intervene to insure a more 
rapid economic growth. 
43cohen, "High Politics, High Finance", p.119. 
H Roger c. Riddell, Foreign Aid Reconsidered 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987) p. 
87. 
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Rostow identified developed states as those which had 
reached an "era of high mass consumption," achieved by 
going through a process of "take-off" into self-sustaining 
growth. Certain social and economic conditions needed to be 
created for "take-off" to occur. First, there must a 
significant increase in the rate of net investment; second, 
one of the manufacturing sectors must have a high growth 
rate; third, there must be an "institutionally favorable 
environment to ensure that the impulses derived from growth 
are transmitted throughout the economy."45 
Underdeveloped countries could reach the "take-off" 
phase more quickly by infusions of two types of foreign aid: 
capital in terms of equipment and supplies, and food and 
consumer goods allowing them to direct more of their own 
resources to development and away from consumption. Of 
course, they would also require transfers of technical 
knowledge and skills. Rostow and fellow economist Max 
Milliken estimated in 1957 that states should only need this 
type of support from ten to fifteen years (although they 
offer no rationale for the choice of this time period). 
Rostow's work was attractive to policy makers because it fit 
so well within the short-term time frame of programs like 
the Marshall Plan. The aim was to give a hand up, but not 
45 The discussion that concludes this section relies on 
that of Roger Riddell in his book Foreign Aid Reconsidered, 
pp. 88-92. It is the concise and yet comprehensive for those 
concerned with the economic theory behind foreign aid 
allocations. 
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to become a substitute for autonomous economic growth. 
Hollis Chenery and Alan Strout were the next economic 
theorists to make a significant impact on development 
theory. They outlined precisely how aid would work to 
accelerate growth in the underdeveloped economies . They 
specified five preconditions for the creation of a developed 
economy: "an increase in human skills, a rise in the level 
of investment and saving, the adoption of more productive 
technology, changes in the composition of output and 
employment, and the development of new institutions." 
However, in trying to achieve all these preconditions, 
states will face "bottlenecks;" specifically, shortages of 
skills and organizational ability, constraints on achieving 
required levels of domestic saving and limits arising from 
inadequate supplies of imported commodities and services. 
These are characterized by two different gaps in domestic 
resources: investment-limited growth, where skills and 
savings are in short supply; and trade-limited growth, where 
foreign exchange is in short supply, because export earnings 
are lower than import needs. Foreign aid can help ease 
these bottlenecks by supplementing capital and savings, or 
import needs, or both. 
It should be noted from the preceding outline that the 
term "development" took on a very specific meaning in these 
theories. It involved market economies with governments that 
made rational economic interventions based on adequate 
information about the state's economy. 
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In line with 
Keynesian theory and practice, governments would intervene 
to alleviate problems of unemployment and recession. While 
not advocating socialist economics, these theories give an 
important role to states in managing their own economies. 
However, they ignored the nature of Third World governments 
in terms of the patrimonial orientation of Third World 
politics, and the effect of donor and recipient aid 
bureaucracies in the allocation of capital and technology. 
AID AND BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS 
Chenery and Strout still provide the core theory to 
which reference is made, although there has been 
considerable debate and further work around their basic 
premise: that foreign aid, given certain conditions, can 
speed up development. 46 A more cautious approach was taken 
by Rosenstein-Rodan in 1961. While he emphasized a positive 
role for aid, he also pointed out that increases in 
production resulting from increased capital would not 
necessarily lead to an increase in savings. More available 
cash could also be put into consumption. Ultimately, the 
principal factor of development was not aid per se, but the 
citizens of a country. 47 Rosenstein-Rodan advocated 
4'Riddell, Foreign Aid Reconsidered, p. 92. 
41 Riddell, Foreign Aid Reconsidered p. 91. 
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organizational change along with demonstrated increase in 
savings as a criteria for aid donations. He believed that 
recipient states needed to demonstrate an overall level of 
administrative and developmental organization that could 
adequately cope with aid disbursements in a macroeconomic 
perspective.48 
However, Third World governments do not use aid funds 
with the macroeconomic picture in mind. Aid can represent 
many goods for Third World bureaucrats and politicians. The 
macroeconomic view of recipients is affected by a lack of 
data, uncertainties regarding the prices and quantities of 
commodities for export, and political uncertainty (coup 
d'etat, or other types of violent I unpredictable change). 
The major function of aid is perceived to be the reduction 
of these uncertainties. 49 
In addition, the bureaucratic structure is such that 
the public sector budget may be dispersed by statutory 
boards or other local authorities controlled by the central 
government which may be unable to challenge them. For 
example, aid may be dispersed by farm boards or loan boards, 
which become autonomous and represent a single powerful 
interest group. 58 Mosley writes that "in most developing 
48Riddell, Foreign Aid Reconsidered, p. 92. 
49 Paul 
(Lexington: 
Mosley, Foreign Aid, Its Defense and Reform 
The University Press of Kentucky, 1987) p. 89. 
50Mosely, Foreign Aid, Its Defense and Reform, p. 90. 
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countries a high proportion, often over half, of public 
expenditures are incurred by autonomous agencies and hence 
are not included within the central government budget 11 • 51 
In other words, the process gets coopted by powerful elites. 
This is in direct conflict with Goldstone's picture of 
foreign aid and its uses and its uses by a dictator who has 
become the conduit for foreign aid rewards. 
More significant from a macroeconomic perspective is 
the non-centralized decision-making within the central 
government. The treasury department of a recipient state 
may not know what money the other ministries have spent or 
what aid contracts have been entered into for over a year. 52 
Mosley claims that over fifty percent of recipient states do 
not have a central agency to monitor aid inflows and 
disbursements. 53 There is also a vertical fragmentation 
which occurs; several ministries may have to "sign-off" on 
an aid project before it will be approved. This leads to 
repetitive budgeting--aid amounts are recorded in several 
different budgets. 54 
From a political power perspective, the ministers of 
receiving states are primarily concerned with receiving as 
much aid as possible, provided there are not too many 
51 Mosely, Foreign Aid Its Defense and Reform, p.91. 
52 Mosely, Foreign Aid, Its Defense and Reform, p. 91. 
53 Mosely, Foreign Aid.i Its Defense and Reform, p.91. 
54 Mosely, Foreign Aid.i Its Defense and Reform, p.91. 
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strings attached which constrain their freedom of action. 
Politicians have an interest in so far as it affects their 
sector or region. "How the money is spent may be critically 
affected by where the power lies," and who the individual 
politician seeks to reward. 55 Political patronage often 
determines the selection of beneficiaries. 56 They also 
enjoy showy projects because it demonstrates that they are 
committed to modernizing the country. This holds true for 
both donor and recipients. 57 Aid can pay for services that 
constituents want, postpone price increases and loosen 
crippling foreign exchange constraints.SI 
Furthermore, civil servants enjoy the perks that aid 
provides, such as access to vehicles, air conditioning in 
the office, etc. 5' Like any bureaucracy, different agencies 
want as much aid as they can get so they can become more 
important. 
The important aspect of this description of 
bureaucratic and internal politics in recipient states is 
twofold. First, it shows that foreign aid is not always 
used in the ways in which it is intended at the outset by 
55Desmond McNeill, The Contradictions of Foreign Aid 
(London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1981) p. 91. 
56McNeill, The Contradictions of Foreign Aid, p. 68. 
57McNeill, The Contradictions of Foreign Aid, p. 55. 
SIMosely, Foreign Aid, Its Defense and Reform, p.93. 
5'Mcneill, The Contradictions of Foreign Aid, p. 56. 
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donor states. There seems to be little evidence that donor 
bureaucracies allocate aid projects and monies with the 
stated intention of empowering entrenched recipient 
bureaucracies or enriching elite groups. In fact, the 
opposite would seem to be the goal; donor states have long 
urged recipient states to address inequalities in the 
distribution of wealth. However, the effect is much 
different. Those who have money or control over aid 
projects have power. They use that power to further their 
own interests, which frequently means staying in off ice and 
maintaining the status quo. 
The second point involves leverage. Despite the fact 
that the United States or other bilateral donors may control 
the purse strings, recipient states do not passively receive 
money and let themselves be told what to do. The previous 
discussion of bureaucratic politics above mitigates the view 
that bilateral aid gives a donor state unlimited leverage in 
the affairs of the recipient state. In terms of states like 
Iran and the Philippines, however, each leader played at 
bargaining for as much economic and military aid as 
possible, and gradually emphasized their assets in order to 
achieve greater leverage. 
It will become evident, however, that both the Shah and 
Marcos centralized power around themselves to a large 
degree, but their regimes were debilitated by corruption. In 
the sections analyzing the tenure periods in each state, it 
34 
will become evident that the Philippines, much more than 
Iran relied on foreign aid on a long-term basis. This did 
ennable the United States to assert more leverage, but not 
enough to make Marcos reform his corrupt government. 
CHAPTER II 
THE MARCOS TENURE PERIOD 
This chapter outlines Philippine-u.s. relations prior to the 
Marcos presidency. The purpose is to help the reader 
understand the context of Philippine-u.s. relations when 
Marcos came to power. In addition, the history will 
demonstrate that the use of economic aid to keep Philippine 
presidents who favored the U.S. in power did not originate 
with the Marcos regime. The U.S. forced many concessions 
from the Philippines that were important to its own security 
interests and business interests. What existed prior to the 
Marcos regime constituted a pattern of U.S. support for 
Philippine presidents; foreign aid was used as a reward, and 
withholding promised aid was used as a threat and 
punishment. 
EARLY U.S./ PHILIPPINE HISTORY 
The history of U.S. involvement in the Philippines 
begins with Admiral Dewey's defeat of the Spanish in Manila 
Bay on Hay 1, 1698. There was an indigenous revolutionary 
group, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, which had fought the Spanish 
and was prepared to create a sovereign government. However, 
36 
the United states sought colonization of the Philippines, 
and was awarded ownership by the Treaty of Paris in 
December, 1898. '8 Soon after Aguinaldo declared the 
Philippine Republic, fighting broke out between U.S. and 
Philippine forces. There followed a bloody two year war to 
suppress the revolutionary forces led by Aguinaldo, in which 
atrocities were committed by both parties. 61 After his 
capture on March 23, 1901, the United States proceeded with 
a relatively benevolent and short-lived colonization. 
In 1902, more than 400 school teachers (known as 
Thomasites because they arrived on the steamer Thomas) 
presaged a long process of education and public health work 
intertwined with a conscious effort to prepare Filipinos for 
self-rule; the goal was to introduce democracy to Asia and 
help the supposedly backward people. 62 The model for proper 
government was the United States, with its democratic 
republic and separation of powers. However, opposition to 
colonization gained ground in the United States, which was 
always a philosophically reluctant colonizer. In 1935, the 
Philippine Commonwealth was established as a result of the 
60 Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen R. Shalom, The 
Philippines Reader (Boston: South End Press, 1987), p. 6. 
61 A. James 
(Washington, D.C.: 
page 3. 
Gregor, Crisis in the Philippines 
Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1984) 
62 Frank H. Denton and Victoria Villena-Denton, 
Filipino Views of America (Washington,D.C.: Asia Fellows 
Ltd.,1986), p. 20. 
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Tydings-Mcduffie Act, which determined that independence 
would occur in 1946. In the meantime, the Philippines was 
prepared for democracy, with a governmental system modelled 
on the United States. 
World War II intervened in the decolonization process 
when the Japanese attacked Clark Air Base at the same time 
as the attack on Pearl Harbor. By May of 1942, the last 
U.S. forces in the Philippines had surrendered to the 
Japanese. The Japanese established a puppet Philippine 
republic, and many elite Filipinos collaborated with the 
Japanese 63 This period also created the core of the 
Hukbalahap resistance movement, which was later labeled 
communist and was one of the targets of CIA intervention in 
the 1950s. As in the war for independence era, the elite 
was split between collaboration and resistance. Post war 
punishment of collaborators never amounted to much, simply 
because so many people in the post war government had 
collaborated, or had family members who had done so. 
Rigorous prosecution would have severely depleted the number 
of available and qualified politicians. 64 
General Douglas MacArthur returned to liberate the 
63 For a brief outline of elite collaboration and Huk 
resistance, see Stephen R. Shalom, The United States and the 
Philippines (Philadelphia: Institute for the study of Human 
Issues,1981), p.1-3. 
64 David Joel Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration in 
World War II, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1967) as 
reproduced in Shirmer, The Philippines Reader, p.79. 
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Philippines on October 20, 1944. The Philippines was 
devastated by the battle to defeat the Japanese, and Manila 
was second only to Warsaw in terms of war damage. 65 An 
estimated one million died while fighting with the U.S. 
against the Japanese. " The Philippines looked forward 
with confidence to American aid with the task of rebuilding 
their country. 
RECONSTRUCTION AND INDEPENDENCE 
The Philippines achieved independence on July 4, 1946. 
However, the transition from commonwealth to sovereign state 
was marked by profound Filipino frustration and 
disappointment. The cause concerned the small amount of 
U.S. economic aid given for purposes of reconstruction 
versus Filipino expectations, and the conditions attached to 
receiving it. The Rehabilitation Act which authorized the 
aid was signed by President Truman of April 30, 1946. 
The legislation resulting from the hearings conducted 
by the U.S. House Committee on Insular Affairs resulted in 
$120 million to the Philippine government for the repair of 
roads, port and harbor facilities and other public property 
65Robert Pringle, Indonesia and the Philippines (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 11. 
66 Pringle, Indonesia and the Philippines, p. 11. 
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and $100 million worth of surplus U.S. property. 67 The 
remainder of the funds provided was provided to individuals 
for the restoration of private property. 61 Ultimately, $400 
million was paid to private individuals and businesses." 
The reasoning behind the relatively small amount of payment 
transferred to the Philippines was the belief that 
reconstruction would create investment opportunities for 
private U.S. capita1 78 • 
Towards this end, passage of the Rehabilitation Act 
was contingent on acceptance by the Philippine government of 
the Bell Trade Agreement. Briefly, the trade agreement tied 
the Philippine economy to the United States by establishing 
a system of preferential tariffs and amending the Philippine 
Constitution to allow up to 100% ownership by U.S. firms of 
utilities and investment in exploitation of natural 
resources. 11 This preferential treatment is referred to as 
"parity clause." 12 As well, the agreement provided for 
quotas of certain raw materials (sugar, cordage, coconut 
oil, rice, cigars, etc.) that could be sold to the United 
61 Stephen R. Shalom, The United States 
Philippines (Philadelphia: ISHI, 1981), p. 35. 
and the 
61 shalom, The United States and the Philippines, p.36. 
39. 
69 shalom, The us and The Philippines, p. 36. 
70 shalom, The United States and the Philippines, p. 
11 schirmer, The Philippines Reader, p. 87. 
12 schirmer, The Philippines Reader, p.87. 
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States without duty until 1954.73 After that time, 
increasingly larger percentages of the allowable quota would 
be subject to duty. 74 AlsD, it allowed unlimited 
importation of U.S. goods duty free into the Philippines for 
eight years, followed by only partial tariffs for twenty 
years. 75 
The State Department opposed trade preferences, arguing 
that the United states didn't need them to secure foreign 
markets, and would benefit more from a world wide system 
without discriminatory trade barriers. 76 Congress, on the 
other hand, responded to special interests, and sought 
tariffs and quotas to protect U.S. industries. 77 For the 
Philippines, the effect was to reestablish the sugar and 
other agricultural industries that comprised the elite power 
structure of Filipino society and political life, and both 
governments acknowledged that preferences would re-establish 
1lsummary of the Bell Trade Act, from Treaties of the 
and Other International Agreements of the United States of 
America, 1776-1949 by Charles I. Bevans, compiler, (Dept. 
of state publication 8728, washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1974, vol 11) p7-18; as reproduced by 
Schirmer, The Philippines Reader, p 88. 
74As reproduced by Schirmer, The Philippines Reader, p 
88. 
75 William Chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987), p. 38. 
76 shalom The us and the Philippines, p. 38. 
77shalom The us and the Philippines, p. 40. 
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the pre-war status quo. 11 What is significant, however, is 
the degree of intervention and presence in the Philippine 
economy this allowed to United States investors, and the 
fact that the arrangement was the necessary price of 
independence. 
The other important piece of post-war independence 
legislation involved military base agreements and military 
aid. Filipinos have strongly resented the bases as an 
infringement on Filipino sovereignty and their existence has 
created ongoing tension in the U.S.-Philippine relationship. 
Essentially the Roxas government acquiesced to the United 
states, leasing sixteen bases including Clark Air Base and 
Subic Naval Base for a period of ninety-nine years in order 
to get U.S. military aid. 79 U.S. military commanders had 
authority over any crime committed on the bases (except 
between Filipino citizens), and any crime committed off the 
bases between members of the U.S. armed forces or during the 
act of performing a military duty. While the condition of 
extraterritoriality was the same as that governing NATO 
allies in Western Europe (where U.S. forces were present), 
the base agreement also prohibited the Philippine government 
from granting any other state access to the bases or any 
71 shalom The us and the Philippines, p. 44-45. 
19 chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution, p.40. 
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other base rights without U. s. consent. BO As well, the 
United States was given the right to recruit Filipinos for 
U.S. military service.11 
Military aid was viewed in 1947, with the first of the 
base agreements, as partial payment for base rights, by both 
the U.S. and Philippine governments. 12 The Philippines 
benef itted because the aid was primarily intended to 
strengthen internal security; this orientation fostered the 
creation of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group 
(JUSMAG). Besides provision of military training and 
assistance with planning, JUSHAG was specifically designed 
to occupy the field of military planning to the exclusion of 
all other states, and to support the political orientation 
of the Philippines toward the United States. 13 Yet the tacit 
acknowledgement that military aid was partial payment for 
the bases didn't lessen the fact of the overwhelming 
'°"Military Bases: Agreement Between the United States 
and the Republic of the Philippines, March 14, 1947," in A 
Decade of American Foreign Policy, Basic documents, 1941-
1949, printed as Sen. doc. 123, 8lst Congress, 1st sess., 
1950, pp. 869-81, as reproduced by Shalom, The US and the 
Philippines, p. 62. 
11 shalom The US and the Philippines, p. 62. 
12 shalom The us and the Philippines, p. 64. 
13 Adjutant General, War Department, to Commander-in-
Chief, AFPAC, 9 October, 1946, p.2, enclosure 6 to U.S. 
Military mission to the Philippines, History of United 
States Military Advisory Group to Republic of the 
Philippines, vol. 1, 1 July 1946 to 30 June, 1947, 
unpublished, available at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., as 
cited in Shalom The US and the Philippines, p. 66. 
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military presence of another country, even if it was the 
U.S. 
THE HUKBALAHAPS, U.S. INTERVENTION, GROWING NATIONALISM 
The years following independence saw a considerable 
amount of CIA intervention into Filipino political life. 
The suppression of the Hukbalahaps (a.k.a. Huks) from 1946 
through the Magsaysay presidency, who were viewed by the CIA 
as being communist insurgents, is one of the most visible 
instances of this intervention. In addition, the United 
States attempted to control the selection of candidates for 
Presidential off ice through the traditional Filipino method 
of buying political loyalty. Since all candidates were 
corrupt, it was really a matter of which one would prove to 
be the strongest U.S. supporter. 
Ramon Magsaysay, first as defense minister under 
president Quirino, and then as President, was credited with 
defeating the Huks. In reality, he was advised by Edward 
Lansdale, a CIA station chief in the Philippines; he was 
ordered to the Philippines as an advisor on 
counterinsurgency techniques nominally with the joint U.S. 
Military Advisory Group (JUSHAG). 84 Lansdale was actively 
involved in coordinating the Philippine Civil Affairs 
Off ice, which sponsored propaganda campaigns against the 
84 shalom, The us and the Philippines p. 79-79. 
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Huks. 85 He and Magsaysay were responsible for coordinating 
the campaign against the Huks, and shared a room together at 
JUSMAG headquarters. 86 Lansdale was also instrumental in 
helping Magsaysay to attain the presidency; he introduced 
him to foreign correspondents and arranged for him to be 
honored both in New York city and Washington, o.c.87 
Lansdale arranged for $500,000 in clandestine campaign funds 
to be funneled into the campaign coffers.88 
frequently charged that the United States 
Magsaysay 
had lost 
confidence in Quirino, and that U.S. aid would be cut off if 
Quirino was re-elected.89 
The Huks had not worked with the resistance forces 
coordinated 
occupation. 
by the United States during the Japanese 
Instead, they had been labelled a communist 
organization, because their military leaders were communist. 
Most of the rank and file were not. 96 When the war was 
over, a concerted effort was made to hunt them down at the 
insistence of landlords who feared agrarian reform. 91 For 
the Huks, the struggle against the Japanese and 
85 Shalom, The US and the PhiliQQines, p. 78. 
86 Shalom , The US and the Philippines p. 77. 
87shalom The US and the PhiliQQines, p. 88. 
88 shalom The us and the PhiliQQines, p.88. 
89 shalom The US and the PhiliQQines p. 89. 
96 Chapman, Inside the PhiliQQine Revolution, p. 58. 
91 Chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution, p. 61. 
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collaborationist landlords was now directed against 
exploitative landlords. 92 The Philippines was experiencing a 
new type of agriculture, which was profit oriented. This 
meant that instead of the old paternalism, peasants received 
a smaller part of the harvest, without the reciprocal 
obligations that characterized the pre World War II 
haciendero system. 93 The rebellion sputtered and died from 
a combination of effective military action by a revitalized 
Filipino military led by Magsaysay, fatigue on the part of 
the Hukbalahaps fighting since early in World War II, and 
because Magsaysay's modest reforms were what most 
conservative peasants wanted. 94 
Philippine land tenure patterns follow the haciendero 
system, reflecting 400 years of Spanish colonization. An 
oligarchy owned large plantations as the source of their 
wealth and formed the core families of the elite. Oligarchs 
provided the money to bribe or buy the constituents for 
political candidates, and elected officials always 
discovered methods of preventing stringent land reform 
legislation. JUSMAG and CIA assistance in suppression of the 
Huks essentially ended any chance of power redistribution or 
alteration of the post-war status quo, because land tenure 
92Inside the Philippine Revolution, p. 64. 
93 Peter Bacho, "Rural Revolt in the Philippines: 
Threats to Stability?" in Journal of International Affairs 
Winter/Spring 1987, Vol. 40, no. 2, p. 261. 
' 4 "Rural Revolt in the Philippines," p. 261. 
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patterns and the control of wealth remained static. 
The evolution of CIA involvement in the choice of 
electoral candidates in the post-independence period stemmed 
from several pressures. The first came from the Huk 
rebellion itself. Second, the Philippines was a valuable 
bastion of democracy in an Asia that was either 
authoritarian (Republic of China) or communist (People's 
Republic of China) . 95 Third, concern for keeping the 
Philippines as a showcase for democracy led to concern over 
the incredible corruption of the both the Roxas and Quirino 
presidential regimes." The amount of corruption in 
political life, coupled with the extreme inequities of 
income distribution, was recognized as a worrisome 
combination. 
In addition to these problems, according to Daniel Bell 
(the State Department's leading expert on the Philippines 
who led a special mission in June 1950), the state was 
facing financial collapse. 97 In order to receive additional 
economic assistance, however, the Quirino government agreed 
to reforms recommended by the Bell Mission, including an 
increase in tax receipts, a tax on the sale of foreign 
exchange, the enactment of a minimum wage law, land reform 
95Indonesia and the Philippines, p. 13. 
" Gabriel Kolko, Confronting York: Pantheon Books, 1986), p. 63. the Third 
97 shalom The US and the Philippines, p. 82. 
World (New 
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and improving and reorganizing the public administration. 98 
U.S. policy makers pressured Quirino to accept U.S. 
advisors, because they believed it would be "dissipated" 
otherwise. 99 The $250 million package was bribe by the 
Truman administration to get Quirino to pursue reforms and 
accept U.S. advice and supervision.108 
United States policy makers in 1951 were dismayed at 
the thought of Quirino winning in 1953, since he was 
considered an opportunist of the first order whose loyalty 
couldn't be determined with any degree of certainty.101 
Quirino's offer to withdraw in favor of Filipino ambassador 
to Washington, Vincente Madrigal, on the condition that 
Madrigal's war damage claim would be paid off, "further 
estranged" U.S. policy makers.102 
Magsaysay was originally appointed as the Defense 
Minister in Quirino's cabinet, at the urging of American 
ambassador Myron M. Cowen. 183 His speeches were written by 
the CIA104 , which also played some dirty tricks on Quirino's 
" Shalom The US and the Philippines, p. 83, quoting 
from the Bell Report, pp. 1 (quote), 3-5, 59, 81, 
95,101,105. 
"shalom, The us and the Philippines p. 83. 
108 Shalom, The US and the Philippines 
101 Shalom The us and the Philippines, p. 87. 
102 Shalom The US and the Philippines, p. 87. 
183 Shalom The US and the Philippines, p. 76. 
104 Shalom The US and the Philippines, p. 76. 
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campaign such as doping the drinks of Quirino's speech 
makers. 105 Magsaysay's death on March 17, 1957 was a blow for 
U.S. policy makers since no candidate was ever as completely 
devoted to U.S. interests or as manipulable. 
One of Magsaysay's important achievements during office 
from the U.S. perspective involved the negotiation of the 
Laurel-Langley agreement, which replaced the Bell Trade Act 
on September 6, 1955. The new agreement extended parity to 
other industries besides raw materials and utilities, giving 
U.S. investors a much better path into the Philippine 
economy. 106 In order to placate the vocal nationalist 
opposition, parity was scrupulously extended to Filipino 
entrepreneurs, the tie-in of the peso to the dollar was 
eliminated, as well as absolute quotas except for sugar and 
cordage . 107 In addition, the agreement allowed each state to 
impose restrictions on the imports of products that harmed 
domestic production .108 
The two developments of the Garcia and Macapagal 
presidencies involved continuing corruption in politics, and 
growing nationalism from an emerging middle class and 
intelligentsia. James Burkholder Smith, a covert action 
105 Shalom The US and the Philippines, p. 91. 
106 Shalom The US and the Philippines, p.97. 
107 Shalom The US and the Philippines, pp.96-97. 
108 Shalom The US and the Philippines p. 96-97. 
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specialist with the CIA, was stationed in the Philippines 
during Garcia's presidency. He has written that 
Garcia hadn't been in office six months before false 
bills of lading became standard at the Manila harbor, 
copra was being smuggled out of the southern islands in 
huge amounts, and a payoff system was put into effect 
for condufiJing any sort of transaction with the 
government 8 
In terms of growing nationalism, Claro M. Recto, who ran as 
candidate in the 1957 presidential election, was one of the 
leading nationalists of this era. He advocated completely 
removing U.S. bases from Filipino soil because they 
infringed on Filipino sovereignty and because they acted as 
magnets for foreign attack.HO During the 1957 Philippine 
election, when Recto ran for President the CIA again played 
"dirty tricks" to prevent his election. 111 
In terms of foreign aid and control and internal 
politics, foreign aid was used consciously as both a carrot 
and a stick prior to the Marcos presidency. The Trade Act is 
one example of this, but others include a promise by the 
Truman administration of $250 million dollars of economic 
aid in exchange for Quirino's agreement to accept U.S. 
economic advisors, pursue tax reform and agree to pursue the 
reforms called for by the Bell mission. 
10' James Burkholder Smith, Portrait of a Coldwarrior 
(New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1976) as quoted in The 
Philippine Reader, p.149. 
110 The Philippines Reader, p. 152. 
111 Shalom The US and the Philippines, p. 104. 
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MARCOS REGIME PRIOR TO MARTIAL LAW 
Ferdinand Marcos was elected president on November 9, 
1965. Former President Diosdado Macapagal, who owed his 
election to CIA support, 
corruption within the 




estimated in 1965 that one-third of all government revenues 
were consumed by corruption.112 As well, Macapagal had been 
supported because he advocated a continuation of the U.S.-
Philippines trade system. In return for lifting all 
exchange controls, Macapagal won $300 million in U.S. and 
I. M. F. aid . 113 
The CIA reportedly stayed out of the 1965 election 
since both Macapagal and Marcos were pro-u.s. In 1966, 
however, soon after his election, Marcos pushed through a 
measure to send 20,000 engineering corps troops to Vietnam, 
and authorization to allow the United States to use the 
military bases as logistic centers. 114 In return, the 
Johnson administration, upon Marcos visit to Washington, 
o.c. and President Johnson's return visit to the 
Philippines, responded with $38 million in grants and an 
additional $39 million for expenses incurred in sending 
112 Confronting the Third world, p.187. 
113 Kolko, Confronting the Third world, p. 187. 
114 Kolko, Confronting the Third world, p. 188. 
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Filipino troops to Vietnam. 115 "The Administration (Johnson] 
knew it would have to reward him with significant aid and 
that it would be channeled into Marcos's political coffers-
--perhaps even in his pocket." 116 
Marcos had run on a campaign slogan of "rice, roads and 
schoolhouses." 117 Prior to his election, the situation in 
the Philippines had deteriorated. Inequity in income 
distribution had increased, police protection was 
inadequate, and those who could afford to do so created 
private armies .111 Freedom of expression had degenerated 
into "wild journalistic license and social anarchy began to 
threaten individual liberty." 119 
Despite his campaign promises, Marcos did very little 
to ameliorate the inequities in Philippine society. However, 
there were other forces creating difficult problems for 
Marcos, as for any leader. The Philippines was experiencing 
demographic changes which included population growth, a 
diminishing amount of land available to small farmers, and a 
trend toward the mechanization of farming.120 As a result 
115 Kolko, Confronting the Third World, p. 188. 
116 Kolko, Confronting the Third World , p. 188. 
117 Theodore Friend, "Marcos and the Philippines," 
Orbis, vol. 32, no. 4, Fall 1988, p. 571. 
lll Friend, "Marcos and the Philippines", p. 571. 
119 Fr lend, "Marcos and the Phi 1 ippines", p. 571. 
120 Chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution, p. 90. 
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farm peasants no longer had the same value for hacienderos 
and many no longer had jobs. Migration to the cities 
occurred, and it is during the 1960s that the squatter 
colonies first appeared, growing from 60,000 to 800,000 
during that decade .121 
Also, a split had developed within the elite between 
those who wanted to continue to use political office for 
personal aggrandizement, and those who wished to pursue 
policies designed to sever ties with the United states and 
pursue more protectionist economic policies. The 1969 
election which returned Marcos to power was violent and 
fraudulent 122 To finance his campaign Marcos raided the 
national treasury to such an extent that it caused inflation 
ranging from 15\ to 20\ over the next three years. 123 The 
United States also helped Marcos's reelection campaign, by 
allegedly allowing large sums paid to u.s. government 
employees in U.S. dollars to be sold at black market rates 
in Hong Kong. The money was then routed to Marcos, and it 
may have been as much as $200 million. 124 
However, Marcos' problems worsened in his new term. 
121 Chapman, Inside the Philippines Revolution, p.90. 
122 Chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution, p.93. 
123 Kolko, Confronting the Third World , p. 249-250. 
124 w. Scott Thompson, "U.S. Role in the Philippine 
Transition," in Authoritarian Regimes in Transition, edited 
by Hans Binnendijk. Washington, o.c.: U.S. Department of 
State, Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of 
Foreign Affairs, 1987. p.307. 
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Late in 1969, the Movement for the Advancement of 
Nationalism (MAN) was created to help cure a "sick" 
Philippine societyl25. The middle class and landowners 
became increasingly fearful of communist rural revolution, 
despite the fact that the New People's Army (NPA), the 
military wing of the Philippine communist party, had 
approximately 390 members in 1969, and dropped to 379 in 
1971.12' However, Marcos expertly played on the fears of the 
middle class, and blaming 
communist machinations .127 
agitation and rebellion on 
In addition, from January to March, 1970, student 
protests known as the First Quarter Storm commenced, serving 
as a focal point for widespread dissatisfaction. Philip 
Shabecoff, writing for the New York Times, reported that: 
The oligarchy also is accused of using its 
political power to concentrate more of the 
national wealth into its own hands. 
Almost daily, the Manila newspapers carry 
articles of scandals in which friends and 
relatives of Government officials are awarded huge 
Government contracts or loans for economically 
worthless projects. 
Meanwhile, small farmers are unable to get 
loans for seed and fertilizer from their local 
rural banks because the Government does not have 
enough money to distribute to these banks. 
Crime and violence have been getting out of 
control. Political murders are almost daily 
occurrences. Politicians and businessmen hire 
professional gunmen for protection. In the hills 
of Central Luzon, Communist insurgents and 
125 Chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution, p. 92. 
126 Kolko, Confronting the Third World, p. 251. 
127 Chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution, p. 92. 
Government forces intended to ?uell them outdo 
each other in acts of terrorism. 12 
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In addition to these pressures, a Constitutional 
Convention was convened in 1971 to revise the country's 
constitution. Marcos had reportedly bribed several 
representatives to eliminate the amendment limiting the 
presidency to eight years, although it wasn't certain that 
there were enough votes to override the nationalist 
convention members .129 Also, in August of 1972, the 
Philippine Supreme Court issued two rulings, the Quasha and 
Lustevco decisions that were strongly against U.S. 
interests. Briefly, the Quasha decision held that U.S. 
ownership of private agricultural land had been illegal 
since 1946. The Lustevco decision decreed that firms in 
sectors of the economy reserved to Filipinos could not have 
foreigners as directors or management personne1. 138 Gabriel 
Kolko writes that 
It was clear now that Laurel-Langley would not be 
renewed when it expired in July 1974 and that U.S. 
investments with a book value of $640 million in 
1979 (but a market value esn1mated at three times 
that) would be jeopardized. 
121 Philip Shabecoff, "Protest Movement in 
Philippines Widening Rapidly," New York Times, March 
1970, p.10. 
1" Shalom, The Philippines Reader, p.164. 
130 Shalom, The US and the Philippines, p.169. 





Martial law was publicly announced September 23, 1972. 
In the preceding months, several bombings had occurred 
around Manila. Marcos blamed communist subversives. On 
September 22nd, there was an unsuccessful assassination 
attempt upon the life of Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. 
During the revolution Enrile revealed that the assassination 
attempt was engineered by Marcos as a pretext for declaring 
martial law. 132 
The stated goals of martial law were to create what 
Marcos termed the New Society and to restore order. Marcos 
ostensibly sought to root out corruption, redistribute land, 
and break the power of the landed oligarchy that had 
controlled Philippine politics. However, by the end of 
martial law, the economy was in a worse position, and 
corruption was just as severe; the difference was that the 
corruption centered around the misuse and appropriation of 
funds by Marcos cronies, and by Marcos himself and his 
family. 
Theodore Friend points out that opposition to martial 
law when martial law was first declared the reaction was 
"surprisingly light; real resistance was almost nil; 
132 Friend, "Marcos and the Philippines," p. 572. 
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unexpressed relief considerable. 11133 Marcos was successful 
in coopting members of the left such as Luis Taruc, a former 
Huk leader, and Blas Ople, leftist labor leader. 134 Hundreds 
of thousands of weapons were confiscated, demonstrations and 
strikes were prohibited, and summary procedures were 
introduced to deal with street er ime .135 Marcos also 
attempted ambitious projects including road building, rural 
electrification, land reform and irrigation.136 
On the financial front, Marcos created a new class of 
technocrats to manage the economy. While the Laurel-Langley 
expired in 1974, the Quasha and Lustevco decisions were 
overturned. Marcos opened up the economy to foreign 
investment to a considerable degree, and proceeded to 
implement policies that would change the orientation of the 
economy from import substitution to export-oriented 
growth. 137 Legislation was introduced opening commercial 
banks to foreign investment, guaranteeing the repatriation 
of capital, providing tax incentives, and easing entry 
133 Friend, "Marcos and the Philippines" p. 572. 
134 Friend, "Marcos and the Philippines, P· 572. 
135 Friend, "Marcos and the Philippines, P· 572. 
136 Friend, "Marcos and the Philippines, p. 572. 
137 A.James Gregor, Crisis in the PhiliJ2J2ines 
(Washington, D. C. : Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1984), 
p.39. 
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requirements for foreign capital and skills . 138 As well, 
Marcos consolidated and assigned management of critical 
sectors of the economy to trusted loyalists, convinced that 
only cooperation and coordination between major sectors 
could help the Philippine economy.139 
However, the reforms failed spectacularly. The external 
effects of the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks were devastating for 
the Philippine economy, which had begun to pursue an export 
oriented strategy. The world wide recession and subsequent 
debt crisis hit the Philippines hard. External debt went 
from $2.3 billion in 1973, to $3.8 billion in 1975, to $8.4 
billion in 1979.lU In addition, the Central Bank of the 
Philippines had misrepresented the amount of both its 
foreign exchange reserves, and understated the amount of the 
external debt of the Philippines to obtain new loans and 
credits. When pressed by foreign lenders in 1983 (a 90-day 
moratorium on payments had been requested because of alleged 
massive capital flight after the Aquino assassination) the 
external debt was reevaluated at $25 billion. 141 
The massive borrowing also was caused by the need of 
the Marcos government to save industries that had been 
138 Gregor, Crisis in the Philippines, p. 40. 
139 Gregor, Crisis in the Philippines, p.46. 
140 Kolko, Confronting the Third World, p. 257. 
141 Frank Golay, "Cause for Concern 
The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XLV, 
in the Philippines" 
no. 5, p.940. 
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monopolized by the government or that had experienced a high 
degree of government intervention, and which had suffered 
from the effects of crony capitalism. Frank Golay writes 
that 
Inefficient enterprises managed by inexperienced 
entrepreneurs, men who were close to Marcos and 
interested in acquiring business experience, 
crowded out high-productivity activities. the 
cost of inefficiency and waste may be seen in the 
steady increase in the capital to output ratio in 
the Philippine economy. Increases in gross 
domestic product per capita in ASEAN countries 
other than the Philippines averaged 5.1 percent 
over the 1960s and 1970s, whereas thfi Philippine 
growth rate averaged only 2.8 percent. 42 
There is convincing evidence of large scale corruption, 
which significantly impaired the economic 
ultimately support for the government. 143 
program and 
However, the amount of intervention was more extensive. 
An analysis done by economists from the University of the 
Philippines tabulated 688 Presidential Decrees and 283 
Letters of Instruction which represented a form of 
government intervention in the economy. lU Marcos issued 
exclusive rights to import, export, or exploit certain areas 
of activity; authority to collect large funds that were then 
privately expropriated; and preferential treatment of 
certain firms in an industry to extend new credit or to 
938. 
142 Golay, "Cause for Concern in the Philippines," p. 
143 Gregor, Crisis in the Philippines, p. 46. 
lH Golay, Crisis in the Philippines, p. 938. 
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restructure credit.145 
Martial law was officially lifted on January 17, 1981. 
However, Marcos kept most of the political power he had 
acquired under martial law. Liberal opposition leader 
Benigno Aquino, who had been imprisoned for most of the 
martial law period, had been given permission to travel to 
the United States for needed heart surgery. He returned in 
anticipation of the National Assembly elections scheduled 
for May 1984, hoping to unify the opposition. His 
assassination on August 21, 1983, galvanized the Filipino 
populace. Two million people attended his funeral 
procession. 146 Massive street demonstrations encompassed all 
socio-economic groups, and continued for a month 
afterwards . 147 From that point on, Marcos came under 
increasing pressure from the United States regarding the 
abuses of his presidency. 
145 Golay, Crisis in the Philippines, p. 938. 
146 Friend, "Marcos and the Philippines," 
147 Claude Buss, Cory Aguino and the People of the 
Philippines (Stanford:Stanford Alumni Association, 1987), p. 
16. 
CHAPTER III 
THE SHAH'S TENURE PERIOD 
THE EARLY RELATIONSHIP 
Unlike the Philippines, Iran had very little contact 
with the United States prior to World War II. A treaty 
regulating commerce and navigation between Persia (as it was 
referred to by the West) and the United States was signed in 
1856. In the next century, two separate financial missions 
were dispatched in response to Persian requests for 
assistance with the management of state finances, first in 
1911, and again in 1921. It was believed that the United 
States would not aggrandize itself at the expense of the 
country, unlike the British or Russians.148 The first 
mission, led by Morgan Schuster in 1911, was unable to make 
significant reform of the state's finances. To do this would 
have challenged powerful bureaucrats, the Persian elite, and 
Russian and British interests as well.149 The Russians 
148 Yonah Alexander and Allan Nanes, editors, The United 
States and Iran A documentary History (Frederick: University 
Publications of America, 1980), p.1. 
149 Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 10. 
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successfully intrigued unti 1 Schuster was dismissed .158 The 
second mission, headed by an economic advisor with the State 
Department, Arthur Millspaugh, came to an end primarily 
because Millspaugh wasn't willing to compromise fiscal 
responsibility for Reza Shah's political ends.lll 
During World War II Iran found itself in the 
uncomfortable position of being occupied by three different 
foreign powers, the British, the Russians and the United 
States. The reasoning behind the August 1941 invasion 
rested on two facts: first, Iran provided the surest supply 
line for vital U.S. goods to reach the Soviet Union. 152 
Second, Iran possessed valuable oil fields, and production 
was controlled by the British.153 Occupied zones were 
created, with the British in the south and the Soviets in 
150 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 11. 
151 This is my own conclusion based on reading 
correspondence from U.S. Ministers to Iran, Joseph Saul 
Kornfeld and Hoffman Philip, Charge d'affaires Wallace Smith 
Hurray, and the memorandum of an interview between Minister 
Philip and Reza Shah Pahlavi (the father of the contemporary 
Shah), dated April 14 1927. Reza Shah, in a discussion of 
the matter with Minister Philip, complains that for all his 
good points, Millspaugh 's "disregard for the dignity of the 
government" was enough to obliterate all his good work. As 
cited in Alexander and Nanes, p.43 Despite the friction 
(which it appears was often the job of the State Department 
to smooth over), Millspaugh managed to considerably improve 
the finances of the state from 1921 to 1927. He returned to 
Iran during the war to head a second financial mission; 
however, he was perceived as being in collusion with the 
British, and was unable to have the same success. 
152 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 18. 
153 Rubin, Paced with Good Intentions, p. 18. 
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the north. This arrangement mimicked the pre World War I 
era, when the British and the Russians had signed an 
agreement in 1907, carving 
influence . 154 
the state into areas of 
Reza Shah was pressured into abdicating in favor of his 
son, Mohammed Pahlavi, who was only twenty when he assumed 
the throne . 155 He had little real power, which suited the 
Allies, and the conduct of foreign and domestic affairs was 
"directly subjected to the dictates of the occupying 
forces." 156 The Iranians appealed to the United States to 
assist them in attaining assurances from the British and 
Soviets that they would withdraw after the war had ended . 157 
Thanks to pressure from the United States, an agreement was 
signed by all three states in January of 1942, promising to 
withdraw not later than six months after the end of the 
war .158 
However, the Soviets didn't leave on schedule, and 
continued to occupy northern Iran. Shortly after the 
occupation in 1941, the Soviets had closed their zone to 
free entry, and instituted a number of political and socio-
154 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, P· 19. 
155 Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 26. 
156 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 26. 
157 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 19. 
158 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, P· 19. 
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economic changes, including farming measures and 
reactivating the communist Tudeh party. 159 It became 
increasingly clear that the Soviets hoped to include Iran in 
their plans for post-war expansion. The United States had 
become increasingly aware of Iran's strategic importance 
during World War II, as a source of oil and strategic 
interest as a valuable regional ally against the soviet 
Union.1'8 Cordell Hull, in correspondence with President 
Roosevelt dated August 16, 1943, wrote that 
Since this country has a vital interest in the 
fulfillment of the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter and the establishment of foundations for a 
lasting peace throughout the world, it is to the 
advantage of the United States to exert itself to 
see that Iran's integrity and independence are 
maintained and that she becomes prosperous and 
stable. Likewise, from a more directly selfish 
point of view, it is to our interest that no great 
power be established on the Persian Gulf opposite 
the importanfi American petroleum development in 
Saudi Arabia. '1 
The Soviets had also been seeking an oil concession from 
Iran, along with Great Britain and the United States, which 
the Iranian government, led by Prime Minister Sa'ed had 
1~ Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 27. 
Although he doesn't go into a lot of detail, Saikal does 
mention that certain estates were confiscated and then 
established as model farms with the help of the Red Army. 
Also, new regulations were created favoring the peasantry 
over landowners in crop-sharing, as well as the compulsory 
purchase or confiscation of large amounts of grain for 
government use. 
160 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 30. 
161 Alexander and Nanes, Iran a Documentary History, p. 
104. 
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refused to give to any of the occupying forces until after 
the war. 1'2 The Soviets believed that this refusal was a 
plot coordinated by the British and the United States.163 
Despite the Tehran Declaration of 1943, in which the 
British, the Soviets and the United states had pledged to 
work together to preserve Iran's independence and unity as 
wartime allies, 164 the situation provided a preliminary 
skirmish between post-war rivals in the Cold War which 
emerged after World War I I. us 
A crisis was averted, but only with strong U.S. 
pressure as well as the maneuvering of Iranian Prime 
Minister Qavam. 1" On March 2, 1946, the Soviets offered to 
partially withdraw the troops still stationed in northern 
Iran. 167 However, Americans in Iran observed reinforcements 
instead of withdrawals. 168 The Iranians brought their 
protests to the Security Council, and the United States, 
represented by Secretary of State Byrnes, asserted that the 
United States would do everything possible to compel the 
1'2 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 31-32. 
1'3 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 32. 
1'4 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 23. 
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16' Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.33. 
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Soviets to leave Iran. 169 At the same time, Prime Minister 
Qavam seemingly gave in to Soviet wishes, and negotiated an 
agreement whereby Soviet troops would withdraw completely, 
and the Iranians agreed to the establishment of a joint 
Iranian-Soviet oil company, with the Soviets receiving 51% 
ownership.no However, the Soviets agreed to approval of the 
agreement by the Iranian parliament, the Majlis. 171 The 
Fourteenth Majlis had expired, and by its decree a new one 
couldn't be elected until all foreign troops had departed 
Iranian soil; this meant that the new Majlis would be 
considering 
departed . 112 
the agreement 
Unfortunately, 
after Soviet troops had 
the unrest in Azerbaijan 
continued along with further agitation by the communist 
Tudeh party, which had been considerably strengthened during 
the Soviet occupation. 
A memorandum of a conversation between the Iranian 
ambassador Hussein Ala and Dean Acheson, dated October 8, 
1946, reflects that the situation had deteriorated from the 
Iranian perspective; elections had been called by Prime 
Minister Qavam at a time when it was likely that a large 
number of Tudeh deputies would be elected, and the 
10 Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), p.198. 
110 Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 198. 
171 Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 198. 
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ambassador felt that the state was in danger of Soviet 
infiltration, evidently because Qavam had followed a policy 
of appeasement. 113 The Iranians hesitated to send troops to 
reassert control in Azerbaijan Kurdistan because they feared 
a negative reaction by the Soviets. Prime Minister Qavam 
signed the order to send in troops on December 10, 1946. 
The resistance easily collapsed, because the Soviets chose 
to abstain from· any material support. 114 The Shah believed 
that this resulted from strong U.S. pressure, and the 
realization by the Soviet Union that the United States was 
not bluffing in its support of U.N. members threatened by 
aggression. 115 
In an effort to cope with the difficulties in re-
unifying and regaining political control, the Iranians had 
requested more post-war aid, particularly to be included in 
the Point Four aid program on the same footing as Greece and 
Turkey. These expectations were heightened by U.S. 
assistance during the Soviet occupation after the war.176 
173 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the 
Division of Middle Eastern and Indian Affairs (Minor) 
[Washington,] October 8, 1946. Reproduced in The United 
States and Iran A Documentary History, edited by Alexander 
and Nanes, p. 180. 
174 The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of 
State, Tehran, December 17, 1946, 2 p.m. as reproduced in 
Alexander, Iran A Documentary History, p. 188. 
115 The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of 
State, Tehran, December 17, 1946, 2 p.m. as reproduced in 
Alexander, Iran A Documentary History, p. 188. 
176 Rubin, Paved with good Intentions, p. 36. 
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However, the Truman administration calculated that aid 
should be restricted to token levels for two reasons.117 
First, Iran had a high degree of corruption and uncertain 
development plans, and it appeared unlikely that they would 
be unable to effectively use economic aid. 118 Second, the 
Iranian army did not have the training and the 
sophistication to absorb large amounts of military 
equipment, although the Shah pressed for funding to create 
his own large-scale military deterrent. Instead, he ignored 
U.S. advisors, and seemed obsessed with military hardware.119 
The principal threat to Iran, like the Philippines, was 
perceived by U.S. policy makers to be internal revolution. 180 
As well, Congress was reluctant to give more aid; after the 
corrupt Kuomintang were defeated in China, the feeling was 
that it was better to demand performance in terms of reform 
first before giving aid .181 
In addition to these considerations, the State 
Department was aware that many Iranians would resent the 
appearance of U.S. imperialism replacing British 
imperialism, and Iranian politicians feared to make an 
177 Rubin, Paved with good Intentions, p. 39. 
17I Ervand Abrahamin, Iran Between Two Revolutions , 
p.251. 
179 Abrahamin, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 251, 
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obvious alliance with either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R., 
preferring a traditional "balance" policy between the two 
superpowers. 182 While Iran was eventually included in Point 
Four allocations in 1950, the amounts were very small 
amounting to $500,000 for technical assistance 183 as well as 
a $25 million loan from the Export-Import Bank. Richard 
Cottam has written that this policy actually benefitted the 
United states, because it argued against ability of Iran to 
manipulate the U.S. whenever confronted with Cold War 
concerns were mentioned.184 
THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND MOSSADEQ 
The nationalist movement and the era of Prime Minister 
Mossadeq must be seen interpreted against the background of 
oil concessions, and particularly the AIOC crisis. The 
182 The Acting Secretary of State (Lovett) to the 
Embassy in Iran, Washington, January 3, 1948, 1 p.m. as 
reproduced in Alexander and Nanes' Iran a Documentary 
History, p.189-191. The traditional "balance" policy refers 
to the Iranian strategy of playing one opponent off the 
other, which was the modus operandi in dealing with the 
British-Russian rivalry during the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. Also, the Iranians emerged from the post-
colonial period intensely distrustful of any influence by 
outside powers in internal Iranian affairs, since both the 
Russians and the British had actively engaged in intrigue to 
enhance their interests. 
113 State Department Announcement of Point Four Project 
in Iran October 19, 1950. Reproduced in Alexander and Nanes, 
Iran a Documentary History, p. 211-212. 
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Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) maintained the concession 
on Iranian oil, allowing the British to refine and export 
it. This was a common arrangement for many of the oil rich 
states; they didn't possess the technology to refine their 
own crude, or have the necessary supply routes to transport 
it. However, the division of profits was a remnant from a 
quasi-colonial relationship and was extremely inequitable. 
The last agreement had been negotiated by Reza Shah, and 
involved 20% of the dividends on ordinary shares, and four 
shillings for each ton sold or exported going to Iran.115 
That agreement had been a considerable improvement over the 
previous one. 
When the Iranians refused a Soviet oil concession, they 
perceived it as a good time to renegotiate their agreement 
with AIOC as well, and pursued a 50/50 agreement 116 from 
which Aramco and the Saudis had benefittea.187 The other 
demands, such as training more Iranians, and equal treatment 
by AIOC of Iranian and Royal Navy markets, were not 
unreasonable. 188 However, the British refused the 50/50 
agreement, which angered the Iranians, particularly the 
committee in the Majlis appointed to consider the issue. 119 
115 Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 204. 
186 Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p.204. 
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The committee was led by Mohammed Mossadeq, who had 
consistently argued for greater control by Iran over its own 
resources. 190 In response, his committee recommended 
nationalization, which further antagonized the British.191 
While the current prime minister, Ali Razmara, had 
attempted to persuade the Majlis that Iran could not run the 
industry on its own, he was assassinated March 7, 1951 by a 
nationalist religious group, which also threatened to 
assassinate the Shah. 192 While some writers label Razmara as 
a "British stooge" in his attempts at conciliation, 193 others 
maintain that he was perceived to be supported by the United 
States as well, thanks to the actions of one member of the 
American embassy .194 He was favored by the United States 
because he was perceived as a tough minded reformer, who was 
also wise enough to make a deal with the British to maintain 
the revenue the state needed. In any case, with his 
assassination, it was too late for the British to agree to 
the 50/50 concession. 
Mossadeq was elected as Premier in May of 1951, just 
after the Majlis completed passage of law nationalizing AIOC 
uo Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 37. 
191 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 38. 
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(Apr i 1 3 0, 19 51) . 195 This meant that the AIOC could no 
longer refine and distribute oil for its own profit. AIOC 
calculated that they could easily make up the short fall 
through their other concessions, and a world wide shortage 
of oil would probably prompt the United States to pressure 
Iran to conciliate. 196 By the end of 1952, the British had 
withdrawn assets and advisors, had frozen conversion 
privileges from the Bank of England, and attained an 
agreement with other oil companies not to enter into any 
agreement with Iran replacing AIOc.197 Oil production 
dropped from 241.1 million barrels in 1950 to 10.6 million 
in 1952; the loss of revenue this entailed put a severe 
strain on Mossadeq's budget for promised economic reforms. 198 
While sympathetic to Mossadeq's nationalist 
aspirations, United states policy makers also recognized 
the growing strength of the communist Tudeh party, which 
Mossadeq naively believed he could manipulate. 1" By the time 
195 Rubin Paved with Good Intentions, p.51. The 
nationalization resulted in the well-known Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company Case, which was submitted to the International Court 
of Justice on May 26, 1951 by the United Kingdom on behalf 
of AIOC ( the British government owned 35% of the stock). 
However, the court declined the case on the grounds that 
Iran had not consented to its jurisdiction. Gerhard von 
Glahn, Law Among Nations (New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Company, 1986), p. 240. 
196 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 61. 
197 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.41. 
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the Majlis approved nationalization, 12,000 oil workers were 
on strike and the Tudeh party scheduled a May Day 
demonstration that turned out to be 30,000 strong.200 
Mossadeq was unable to compromise with the British, because 
despite the high cost, nationalization was an extremely 
popular action. His supporters might literally tear him to 
pieces, and he created aspirations and expectations that 
could not possibly be satisfied. 281 Neither could he rely on 
United States aid, although it had increased from $1.6 
million in 1951,and to $23.4 million in 1952. 282 This was 
just enough to pay the military and civil service, but not 
enough to replace the lost oil revenue, in order to force 
I ran into some type of settlement. 203 
Relatively late in the crisis, as the United States 
played honest broker, the Truman administration had tried to 
orchestrate purchase of Iranian oil by U.S. companies. 
However, the Attorney General was in the midst of preparing 
a case which charged these same companies with violation of 
Sherman Anti-Trust regulations. The State Department tried 
to intervene, claiming that petroleum constituted a vital 
national security interest, and President Truman terminated 
the investigation, concluding that for all practical 
200 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.63. 
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purposes, oil operations were instruments of foreign policy 
in these states. However, time ran out for the Truman 
Administration, and it was unable to organize U.S. petroleum 
companies to break the blockade, and thus put pressure on 
the British. 284 
Furthermore, the Shah was actively plotting against 
Mossadeq, since Mossadeq believed in limiting his power, and 
anti-Mossadeq groups clustered around the monarchy. 285 As the 
situation became polarized into pro- and anti- Mossadeq 
camps, the prime minister made two fateful decisions. In 
order to regain control of the military, around which 
support for the Shah converged, Mossadeq tried to assume the 
Shah's constitutional role of commander-in-chief, bypassing 
the Majlis, and declared emergency powers legitimized by a 
referendum. 286 This brought Mossadeq into direct 
confrontation with conservative forces, and he alienated 
supporters with by taking dictatorial actions.207 
Mossadeq's second miscalculation was in appealing to 
Eisenhower in a letter dated May 28, 1953. In the 
communication, he hinted that Iran could become pro-Soviet, 
and might be ripe for Soviet take-over if more aid was not 
204 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, pp. 74-75. 
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extended to meet the economic crisis.~8 Eisenhower refused 
to assist Mossadeq with more aid, recommending that he reach 
an agreement with the British. 209 In addition, the Tudeh 
seemed stronger than ever; a demonstration on July 21, 
1952, attracted between 50,000 and 100,000 demonstrators.no 
From the perspective of the United States, the Mossadeq 
regime had lost the ability to control the country, and 
indeed seemed ripe for communist take-over. Mossadeq had 
made enemies among the conservatives, the royalists, and the 
parliamentarian groups. 211 
The Eisenhower administration made its decision to take 
covert action on June 22, 1953. President Eisenhower's 
reply to Mossadeq's letter of May 28th, refused requests for 
more economic aid. 212 The Shah was informed on August 1st by 
Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA operative in Iran, during a secret 
meeting, that the United States and Great Britain had 
decided to take covert action. 213 The Shah agreed to leave 
the country after issuing two decrees that Mossadeq would 
~• Exchange Between Prime Minister Mossadegh and 
President Eisenhower on the Oil Dispute and the Problem of 
United States Aid to Iran, letter from Dr. Mossadeq to 
President Eisenhower dated May 28, 1953, as reproduced in 
Alexander, Iran A Documentary History, p. 232-233. 
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not comply with, one dismissing Mossadeq, and one replacing 
him with Fazlol lah Zahed i. 214 Mossadeq arrested Colonel 
Nematollah Naslri, when he attempted to deliver the Shah's 
decrees, and proceeded to claim on August 16 via Tehran 
radio that the royalists had attempted a coup d'etat.215 
Tehran exploded with communist demonstrations, and the Shah 
fled to Italy in protest.216 By August 18, soldiers had 
started to demonstrate in the street in support of the Shah, 
and gradually the tide turned against Mossadeq and the 
threat of a communist takeover. 217 While the CIA had 
organized demonstrations to support the Shah, they were much 
larger than anything the agency could have paid for, 
indicating an underlying support for the Shah among the 
masses. 218 By August 19, Falzollah Zahedi was able to come 
out of hiding and assumed power. 
The United States quickly moved to support the new 
regime; $900,000 came from Kermit Roosevelt's safe, and 
Ambassador to Iran Loy Henderson promised to continue Point 
Four aid and to arrange a $45 million emergency grant. 219 
Mossadeq was arrested charged with treason, and imprisoned 
214 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 82. 
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in solitary confinement for three years.220 
CONSOLIDATION OF POWER 
The Shah depended on the United states for his regime's 
survival after Mossadeq's removal from power, and not 
surprisingly, Iran allied itself with the United States and 
the West against the Soviet Union. The Shah moved to 
consolidate his power as quickly as possible, so that the 
Majlis couldn't limit the power of the crown.221 There were 
five groups in opposition to the Shah: the Tudeh, the 
Nationalist Front (Mossadeq's party), the non-partisan 
intellectuals, including the bureaucrats and professional 
class, the organized clergy, and finally anti-monarchist 
tribes in southern Iran. 222 The Shah acted to outlaw the 
National Front in 1957; used martial law, military tribunals 
and a 1931 decree against collectivist ideology to crush the 
Tudeh; allowed provincial governors to use the gendarmerie 
to control elections to the Majlis and the Senate; and 
finally created two parties, led by trusted courtiers, that 
were known colloquially as the "yes" and the "yes sir" 
220 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.45. 
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parties. 223 He then moved to have the Maj lis which lessened 
the quorum needed to pass legislation, and allowing him to 
veto financial bills.224 
The intelligentsia and middle class were increasingly 
intimidated by S.A.V.A.K., the Shah's secret police. 
Officially created in 1957, the organization benefitted from 
training by both the CIA and FBI, as well as Israeli 
intelligence. 225 Using infiltration techniques, it expanded 
its networks, created trade unions through the Labor 
ministry, and scrutinized anyone recruited into the 
university, large industrial plants, or the civil service.226 
Its first leader, General Taimur Bakhtiar, became notorious 
for his brutality and corruption. The role of S.A.V.A.K. in 
Iranian society is hard to adequately describe; Richard 
Cottam, and expert on Iranian politics describes it as a 
kind of Gestapo, 227 and the degree to which it infiltrated 
Iranian society and the intelligentsia was formidable. 
The psychological effect of the organization was 
perhaps the largest aspect of its power, because of the 
nature of the extended family in Iran. Every time someone 
223 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, pp. 329-
420. 
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226 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 420. 
227 Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 288. 
78 
was arrested and questioned and/or killed by S.A.V.A.K., it 
affected the entire extended family unit. 228 This meant the 
organization was able to effectively influence many more 
individuals than the actual target, but that it also 
incurred the enmity of the entire family. S.A.V.A.K. 
punished those suspected of petty offenses as well as 
dissident activities, resulting in a kind of all pervasive 
terror in the general population. 2" The organization 
frequently used brutal torture, and prisoners were often 
released only if they or their family promised to become 
informers. 230 
The United States also supported the Shah's regime. 
Between 1945 to 1952, total grants and credits (this 
includes military as well as economic) to Iran were $29 
million, about half in loans. 231 In 1953, that amount jumped 
to $52 million in grants, and reached $65 million in grants 
in 19 54. 232 Along with the aid, the United States sent 
technical advisors, to assist with economic planning and the 
228 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.177. 
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dispersal of economic aid. 233 In terms of military 
assistance, three different groups were present: ARMISH, the 
United States advisory mission to the Iranian Army, GENMISH, 
the advisory mission to the Imperial Gendarmerie, and MAAG, 
the Mi 1 i tary Assistance Advisory group. 234 The Shah 
constantly pressed for higher and higher amounts of military 
aid, believing that Iran occupied a comparable position to 
Turkey in terms of strategic support for U.S. security. In 
1953, a National Security Council memo admitted that 
military aid to Iran has great political 
importance apart from its military impact. Over 
the long term, the most effective instrument for 
maintaining Iran's orientation toward the West is 
the monarch, which in turn has the Army as its 
only real source of power. U.S. military aid 
serves to improve Army morale, cement Army loyalty 
to the Shah, and thus consolidate the present 
regime and provide some assurance that Iran's 
current orftintation toward the West will be 
perpetuated. 
However, it was the opinion of Eisenhower and Allen Dulles 
that Iran didn't need military expenditure and expansion at 
the expense of the economy. 236 Their belief was that Iran 
could never develop a large enough army to repel a Soviet 
233 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.32. 
234 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 54. 
235 United States Policy toward Iran: A Report to the 
National Security Council by the N.S.C. Planning Board 
December 21, 1953, as reproduce by Alexander, Iran A 
Documentary History, pp. 265-267. 
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invasion, and shouldn't drain its resources in trying. 237 
The Shah was responding to regional instability, 
however, and he had a number of concerns. Egypt was 
embattled with Nasser at its helm, threatened by Britain, 
France, and Israel during the Suez Canal crisis in 1956. 
Iraq suffered a coup d'etat in 1958, and subsequently 
withdrew from the Baghdad Pact. Syria and Egypt threatened 
Lebanon in 1958, and there were Nasserist attempts to 
overthrow King Hussein of Jordan.238 These threats, combined 
with the imperatives of internal political struggle and the 
consolidation of his power, led the Shah to increase the 
armed forces from 120,000 to over 200,000 between 1953 and 
1963, and to raise the military budget from $80 million to 
$183 million (at 1960 prices and exchange rates>. 2" The 
United States also increased its military and economic aid: 
in 1956, the United States gave $23 million, in 1957 $82.5 
million and in 1958 $104.9 million. 240 After the July 1958 
coup in Iraq, deliveries of promised aid were speeded up, 
and $28.6 million of economic aid was converted for military 
purposes, and U.S. authorization was given to expand the 
237 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.98. 
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size of the Iranian army by 37,000 troops.241 
However, congressional hearings before the Foreign 
Operations Subcommittee in 1956 and 1957 found widespread 
corruption and mismanagement of aid funds. 242 This combined 
with growing economic problems and dissatisfaction with the 
lack of democratic institution, and prompted U.S. policy 
makers to reduce military aid to Iran during Fiscal Year 
1960, a decision which greatly angered the Shah, who had 
been pressing for larger amounts of military aid. After the 
Kennedy administration came into office, it was decided that 
the emphasis would change from military to economic aid,243 
and this was consistent with the creation of the Agency for 
International Development (A.I.D.), the Peace Corps and the 
expanded Food for Peace program, which were creations of the 
Kennedy administration. 
THE WHITE REVOLUTION 
To understand the Iranian-u.s. relationship during the 
1960s, it is necessary to briefly discuss the Shah's program 
for development and modernization, announced in 1963 as the 
White Revolution as opposed to red revolution because it 
241 Gasiorowski, Neither East nor West, p. 152. 
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would be accomplished without bloodshed and violence, 244 or 
the alternative explanation is that it was distinguished 
from a communist red revolution. 245 The importance of this 
reform program was the way in which it cemented a certain 
perception of the Shah in the eyes of U.S. policy makers. 
By the early 1960s, Iran was in the midst of an 
economic crisis. To implement an ambitious Seven Year Plan 
for development, the state had resorted to deficit financing 
and heavy borrowing. 246 A bad harvest in 1959-1960 aggravated 
the problem, and strikes increased, ending in bloody 
confrontations. 247 The Kennedy Administration responded by 
offering $85 million in aid, on the condition that the Shah 
bring liberals into his cabinet and pursued meaningful land 
reform; the Kennedy administration also pressured the Shah 
into naming Dr. 'Ali Amini as Prime Minister. Amini was a 
reform minded aristocrat, with allies among the National 
Front as well as the more traditional groups in the Majlis. 
Washington was familiar with him as the Iranian ambassador 
from 1955 to 1958, and as a negotiator in 1954 with the oil 
companies. In Washington's perception he was able to make 
unpopular decisions, and he had a long-term commitment to 
244 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 80. 
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land reform. 
However, his tenure was brief; the National Front 
refused to support him because he would not disassemble 
S.A.V.A.K. 248 , and after he dismissed parliament he failed to 
schedule future elections in direct violation of the 
constitution. 249 Also, the stringent fiscal reform measures 
forced on Iran by the United States and the IMF, which he 
implemented, made him very unpopular. 258 Finally, the United 
States refused to support Amini when he clashed with the 
Shah over the need to cut the military budget. 251 Amini 
blamed the United States for not providing enough aid; 
however, the United States rejected this assertion, 
maintaining that aid levels averaged the same compared to 
the preceding four years. 252 
Of greater interest, perhaps, is that Amini's land 
reform policies involved redistribution of religious lands, 
or waqf lands which generate revenues primarily for 
charitable purposes, and Ruhollah Khomeini was an active 
protester against land redistribution. 253 Khomeini began to 
openly protest in 1962, denouncing the Shah's regime for 
248 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.423. 
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living off corruption, rigging elections, 
violating the constitutional laws, stifling the 
press and the political parties, destroying the 
independence of the university, neglecting the 
economic needs of merchants workers peasant, 
undermining the country's Islamic beliefs, 
encouraging gharbzadegi---indiscriminate borrowing 
from the West---granting 'capitulations' to 
foreigners, selling oil to Israel, and constantlsr 
expanding the size of the central bureaucracies. 
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He was arrested in June and held by S.A.V.A.K. for two 
months, and then was returned to the holy city of Qom, where 
he was held under house arrest. 255 He continued making 
speeches denouncing the Shah's dependence on the United 
States and denounced the power of the army as well as the 
U.S.-Iranian alliance. 256 He was exiled to Turkey in 1964, 
and shortly thereafter went to lecture in theology in 
Iraq. 251 Khomeini's arrest in June of 1963 sparked three 
days of rioting in Tehran, Qom, Isfahan, Shiraz, Mashad, and 
Tabriz, 258 in which riot police killed at least hundreds and 
perhaps thousands. 2~ 
The Shah was now free to announce his own White 
Revolution. Explanations of why the Shah decided at this 
time to pursue reform differ. Some authors, such as James 
254 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 425. 
255 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 111. 
256 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 111. 
257 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 111. 
258 Gary Sick, All Fall Down, p. 10. 
259 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.426. 
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Bill, argue that it was an attempt to create a traditional 
rural class to counter the urban middle class that refused 
to support the Shah. 260 Ruhollah Ramazani ha-s argued that the 
goal was to finally free internal decision making from the 
influence of external political influence through economic 
development. 261 Amin Saikal sees it as an attempt by the 
Shah to achieve two objectives: to widen his base of support 
through carefully controlled mass mobilization; this would 
have the effect of lessening his reliance on the United 
States, which would further strengthen his position. 262 These 
are possible explanations, but what is also of interest is 
that from this period that the United States began to focus 
on the Shah rather than other politicians or groups. The 
Shah consolidated his power and began to assume the image of 
a strong, independent, and decisive leader. 
The White Revolution had six goals: comprehensive land 
reform; nationalization of forests and pastures; public sale 
of state owned factories to pay for the purchase of land for 
redistribution; workers' profit sharing in industry; the 
franchise for women; and the formation of the literacy 
260 James A. Bill, "Modernization 
The Case of Iran" The Journal of 
February, 1970, pp. 19-40. 
and Reform from Above: 
Politics, vol. 32(1) 
261 Ruhollah K. Ramazani, "Iran's 'White Revolution': A 
Study in Political Development" International Journal of 
Middle East studies vol 5, 1974, pp. 124-139. 
262 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 80. 
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corps. 263 The Shah's referendum was considered a sign of 
popular support for his reforms: 99% of the voters endorsed 
the White Revolution program, but the percentage of the 
population that voted was only roughly 25%. 264 
There were doubts within both the CIA and the Bureau of 
the Budget about the capacity of Iran to develop as rapidly 
as the White Revolution plan predicted; the infrastructure 
simply didn't exist to support the type of modernization 
envisaged. 265 The Bureau of the Budget wrote a highly 
critical study of the White Revolution in 1963 that the 
inept application of land reform might lead to reduced farm 
production, and that without the necessary administrative 
and economic support, the Shah would fail to make the 
peasantry into another support group for his regime.266 
Under these circumstances, he would rely increasingly on the 
support of the mi 1 i tary. 267 Also, while the Shah had made 
some progress by downsizing his army, easing his 
relationship with Moscow and providing greater benefits for 
urban workers, the CIA concluded that the Shah would be 
disinclined to follow through on his reforms, since the 
263 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 82. 
264 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 82. 
265 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 112. 
266 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 112. 
267 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.112. 
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White Revolution was inadequately planned.268 
The effect of land reform was successful in the sense 
that almost all large landholdings were eliminated, and the 
landlords' traditional power base, separating the Shah from 
the rural population was eliminated. 26' Also, former 
landlords did use their compensation to invest in industry 
as the Shah had hoped, 270 however there was still resentment 
at the loss of position by landlords including the clergy. 271 
Educational and other reforms were impeded by red tape, and 
the overstaffed and inefficient bureaucracy.272 On the other 
hand, the creation of the Health and Literacy Corps, which 
went out into the country to promote both, mobilized 
educated youth into support of the Shah and his goals. 273 
Also, provision of security benefits for industrial workers, 
such as the legislation of a minimum wage and social 
insurance policy, increased the Shah's urban support where 
he had been traditionally weak.274 
While the Shah mobilized large parts of the population, 
there was no concomitant avenue for political participation 
268 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.112. 
26' Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 85. 
270 Ramazani, Iran's White Revolution, p. 131. 
271 Ramazani, Iran's White Revolution, p.134. 
272 Ramazani, Iran's White Revolution, p. 132. 
273 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.88. 
274 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.87. 
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created. 275 Land reform had ultimately failed, because the 
holdings of most of the beneficiaries were too small, and 
the government created state-run farm corporations in 1967 
to alleviate the problem. 276 Also, there were loopholes in 
the land reform laws which allowed the royal family, among 
others, to keep 
traditional base 
large tracts of land, thus 
of power. 277 The Shah 
maintaining a 
failed to 
institutionalize the gains he had made, since the Majlis 
continued as a rubber stamp organization, with two official 
political parties. Those groups, brought in to the Majlis, 
formed another source of support for the Shah and political 
dissent was effectively suppressed by S.A.V.A.K. Traditional 
politics continued, with the Shah at the center of a great 
web, refusing to build any institution that might weaken his 
power. 
OIL REVENUES, MILITARY PURCHASES, AND THE APPEARANCE 
OF ABSOLUTE CONTROL 
Much of the Shah's increasing independence from the 
United States, and his ability to build a large army, can be 
attributed to the steady rise in oil revenues. Official 
U.S. economic assistance to Iran was terminated in 1967, as 
275 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.427. 
276 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 429. 
277 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 429. 
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oil revenues continued to climb. Oil income hit a record 
$555 million in 1963-1964, and had increased to $958 million 
in 1968-1969, $1.2 billion in 1970-1971, $5 billion in 1973-
1974, and nearly $20 billion by 1976. 278 Between 1974 and 
1977, cumulative oil revenue topped $38 billion. 
The combination of consolidation of power at home and 
increased oil revenues allowed the Shah to look outward and 
begin to pursue the role of regional leader. He 
increasingly took policy positions that were not in perfect 
alignment with the United States, such as his state visit to 
Moscow in 1965, which garnered two economic and military 
agreements. 279 The first involved supplying the Soviet Union 
with $600 million in natural gas, beginning in 1970; in 
exchange, the Soviets agreed to build a steel mill in 
Isfahan, construct a pipeline from the Caucasus to northern 
Iran, and build a machine tool plant in Shiraz.280 The 
second agreement garnered $110 million dollars worth of 
armored troop carriers, trucks, and antiaircraft guns in 
return for natural gas from Iran. 281 The Shah also 
criticized the United States for food aid to Egypt, since 
Iran and Egypt had broken off diplomatic relations in 1960, 
and Nasser had started supplying rebels in Khuzistan with 
278 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.427. 
27' Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.95. 
280 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.95. 
281 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.95. 
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weapons, in addition to troop maneuvers on Iraqi soil. 282 
Another factor was the assessment by the State 
Department that it was important to supply allies with arms, 
since the Soviet Union was already doing this for their 
allies. Despite the fact that in the assessment of the 
Defense Department's International Security Agency Iran was 
spending too much money on arms, the United States continued 
to supply Iran with sophisticated military equipment in 
order maintain the relationship. 283 
The so called two pillar policy that designated Iran 
and Saudi Arabia as regional security enforcers began during 
the Johnson administration. The United States was heavily 
involved in the Vietnam war at the time the British withdrew 
from the Middle East, and was unwilling to undertake the 
burden of regional security.284 It was unlikely that Arab 
states would trust another Western power, certainly not one 
allied with Israel. 285 The Saudi role was symbolic, while 
Iran provided the real strength. 286 The Shah wanted both 
superpowers out of the gulf, and believed that Iran should 
be able to protect its own interests by maintaining free 
282 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 117. 
283 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 119-120. 
284 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 125. 
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passage through the vital Straight of Hormuz. 287 
After the 1972 meeting between Nixon, Kissinger and the 
Shah, military purchases reached new dimensions. In effect, 
Nixon designated the Shah as the regional power in the 
Middle East, in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine of 
disengagement. Towards the end goal of helping the Shah 
maintain this position, the United States provided carte 
blanche on arms sales. 218 Since the Shah needed no prodding 
to purchase arms anyway, billions of dollars were spent on 
military equipment. 
For the United states, a good relationship with Iran 
was crucial. The United States needed an advocate in OPEC 
and the Shah helped the United States 
of oil despite the embargo of 1973 289. 
Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in the 
to maintain a supply 
Also, he supported 
Middle East despite 
Arab criticism, and promoted an Arab-Israeli accord. 290 The 
other justification used for massive arms purchases in Iran 
was that it helped repatriate dollars into the U.S. economy 
which was severely affected and had slid into a recession 
along with the rest of the world. By 1970, the United 
States had become a net importer of oil, and supply from the 
Middle east was vital to the national economy as well as 
287 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 126. 
288 Gary Sick, All Fall Down, p.15. 
289 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions,p.140. 
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national security. 
It is difficult to comprehend the amount of arms that 
were purchased. In the first four years after the 1972 
meeting, $9 billion worth of equipment was ordered for 
delivery. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger (under 
Nixon) attempted to introduce some restraint through two 
initiatives. First, he privately met with the Shah on 
several occasions, arguing that Iran needed more trained 
personnel, not more sophisticated weaponry which the 
Iranians couldn't operate or service. 291 Second, he 
dispatched Richard Hallock, a highly regarded military 
procurement and management analyst and a former colleague at 
the Rand Corporation, to provide technical advice to the 
Shah. 292 Hallock's position was a delicate one, since he was 
to advise the Shah as well as keep Schlesinger informed of 
the Shah's views and problems as they occurred. 293 Since he 
was also independently on retainer as part of his own 
consulting company to the Government of Iran, Hallock ended 
up balancing three important sets of interests, and as time 
went on, questions were raised about his actions.294 
Ultimately, there was very little that Schlesinger could do 
while Kissinger remained in the White House. During the 
291 Sick, All Fall Down, p.15. 
292 Sick, All Fall Down, p.16. 
293 Sick, All Fall Down, p.16 
2'4 Sick, All Fall Down, pl6. 
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course of his meetings with the Shah, Schlesinger tried to 
dissuade him, but his orders were to approve any item short 
of nuclear weaponry if the Shah insisted. 295 
While the scale indicates the Shah's monomania and the 
manner in which they were purchased indicates the extent to 
which he had centralized power around himself. Essentially, 
a very small group determined security expenditures and the 
military budget was exempt from audit procedures. 296 The Shah 
decided what he wanted, and the loans to purchase such items 
were automatically approved by the Shah's cabinet without 
receiving any information about the equipment itself. 297 
However, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) 
believed that purchases were made without a consideration of 
long-term needs, were not synchronized with training and 
construction schedules, and that as a result, Iran was 
getting less value from its purchases than a better prepared 
state. 291 
Despite the fantastic oil wealth, Iran was still a poor 
country. The Shah stopped the rural investment program, and 
encouraged migration to the cities. Those who stayed in the 
countryside felt the Shah did nothing for them, and those 
295 Sick, All Fall Down, p15 
296 Nicole Ball, Security and Economy in the Third World 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 55. 
297 Ball, Security and Economy in the Third World, p. 
55-56. 
2'8 Ball, Security and Economy in Third World, p. 79. 
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who went to the cities were unable to find jobs and lived in 
slums. The average Iranian was quite poor, and his 
purchasing power was eroded by inflation, particularly for 
food. This kind of life was in direct contrast to the 
wealthy elite and the large number of U.S. advisors and 
technicians, who lived completely apart from Iranians in 
their own complexes. It was difficult for people not to 
believe that Americans were exploiting them, just as the 
Russians and the British had a century before. 
CHAPTER IV 
TENURE COMPARISON 
This chapter compares the tenure periods in each state. 
The comparison is divided into two parts. First, each state 
will be reviewed to determine how well Goldberg's framework 
fits the particular situation. The point is to determine 
how much influence the United States wielded over each 
leader, and whether U.S. influence, in terms of foreign aid, 
caused these leaders to become too dependent on the U.S. for 
foreign aid and over identified with the United States. 
Also, U.S. demands for actions as quid pro quo for foreign 
aid may have antagonized the nationalist feelings of 
opposition groups, making it difficult for them to maintain 
control. 
Second, an assessment will be made of the other factors 
included for comparison, specifically the historical 
relationship with the United States, the amount of U.S. 
presence in the country and the role of religion in 
political life. These factors will be compared between the 
two states in order to evaluate their impact prior to the 
crisis period. 
Before commencing the comparison and analysis, a review 
of Goldberg's framework may be helpful. Goldberg 
hypothesizes that 
examples of the 
characteristics. 
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Marcos and the Shah both constitute 
neopatrimonial regime, which has certain 
Chief among these is the centralization of 
power by the ruler, urban based support rather than mass 
popular support, and the presence of congresses and 
parliaments with little real power. Also, the leader acts as 
a power broker among four elite groups: traditional 
oligarchies, new professionals, the military and the 
bureaucracy. The neopatrimonial leader plays one group off 
of another to maintain power. 
The neopatrimonial leader depends primarily on a system 
of patronage and coercion to maintain authority. The 
patronage system must be fueled, however, by monetary or 
prestige awards. Foreign aid solicited, won, and dispensed 
by the leader can provide the resources which are necessary 
to maintain his power. However, there are two costs for the 
dictator. First, leaders develop an overreliance on foreign 
aid at the expense of building mass political support. 
Second, the United States may demand quid pro quos which 
irritate the nationalist feelings of elite and other groups. 
Over identification can occur, and the leader can lose 
legitimacy, being perceived as a puppet or tool of the 
United States. Finally, if economic growth falters, he may 
not be able to provide fuel for the patronage machine which 
is his means of support. 
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THE PHILIPPINES 
Although the Philippines generally fits the framework 
very well, there are some discrepancies between it and the 




after martial law was imposed in 1972, although 
are some significant variations. Essentially, 
provided Marcos with the opportunity to 
centralize power to a much greater degree; previously, he 
was constrained by the Congress, despite the fact that many 
could be bribed to his advantage. A demonstration of this 
restraint can be seen in Marcos' uneasiness regarding the 
Constitutional Convention. Although he spent a lot of money 
in trying to make sure that a provision limiting the 
president's term to eight years wouldn't be upheld, he could 
not be sure. The nationalist opposition was comprised of 
individuals (like Benigno Aquino) that were as wealthy and 
almost as powerful as he was. Undoubtedly, there were also 
convention members who were completely sincere in their 
beliefs in limiting presidential tenure and power, who 
couldn't be bought. 
The four elite groups that Goldstone identifies---
oligarchy, military, bureaucratic and new professional 
varied in strength. The military as a separate influential 
political entity didn't exist, and neither did the 
bureaucratic elite to a significant degree. The 
, 
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professional class was split between a newly expanded 
entrepreneurial group and the old liberal intelligentsia, 
comprised of the professional and entrepreneurial part of 
the traditional elite. The bureaucracy as a separate class 
isn't discussed, although Marcos did fill it with people 
loyal to him. The real strength in Philippine politics lay 
in the landed aristocracy. The reason for this is partly 
historical and partly cultural. 
Th~ Spanish created an indigenous landed upper class 
during their colonization. This class was preserved when 
the United States became the colonizer. 299 The CIA, in a 
National Intelligence Survey report in 1965, observed that 
"the Philippines has traditionally been dominated by a 
small, wealthy elite, consisting of large landholders and a 
few powerful industrial and commercial entrepreneurs, and 
their lawyers." 3oo Al though the strength of the managerial 
and technical groups grew during the 1960's, they were 
unable to challenge the prevailing power structure 
controlled by the elite.301 The elite controlled extensive 
patron/client networks, which were reinforced by cultural 
practices. 
299 Pringle, Indonesia and the Philippines, p. 8. 
300 CIA, Philippines: General Survey, National 
Intelligence Survey, NIS 99, July 1965 [sanitized copy 
released November 19801, pp. 48-54 reproduced by Schimer, 
The Philippines Reader, pp. 126-131. 
30l CIA, General Survey, pp 48-54, as reproduced by 
Schirmer, The Philippines Reader, pp 126-131. 
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What occurred after the imposition of martial law, 
however, was the selection of certain portions of the 
aristocracy to benefit from Marcos patronage. With the 
imposition of martial law there was no challenge to 
eliminating important families and their profits to enrich 
Marcos and his cronies, as well as his family. An example 
is Marcos management of the sugar industry. Growers were 
forced to sell through the National Sugar Trading Company, 
managed by Bobby Benedicto, a former fraternity brother of 
Marcos at the Philippines Law School. 302 He was given 
authority to negotiate all contracts for purchase, milling 
and sale. 303 Losses through financial and market 
manipulation by Benedicto have been estimated at between 11 
billion pesos and 14 billion pesos (value of the peso ranged 
from seven to the dollar in 1981 to twenty in 1985). 304 This 
coincided with a world wide downturn in demand for sugar and 
the loss of the U.S. quota in 1974. 305 The planters lost 
their easy lifestyle, and workers starved because mills 
closed; half the work force was on part-time, and one in 
five was unemployed.386 Planters also comprised a large group 
of the aristocracy which had no reason to love Marcos. While 
302 Buss, Cory Aguino and the PeoQle , p. 53. 
303 Claude Buss, Cory Aguino and the People p. 53. 
' 
304 Claude Buss, Cory Aguino and the People, p. 54. 
305 Buss, Cory Aguino and the PeoQle , p. 53. 
306 Claude Buss, Cory Aguino and the People , p. 54. 
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it can be argued that the downturn in demand would have had 
these effects whoever managed the industry, the extent of 
the impoverishment was likely due to corruption and 
mismanagemement by Bobby Benedicto. 
The fact that Marcos assigned certain parts of the 
economy to friends and relatives was not shocking in itself, 
because there was an expectation that family would be 
provided for by the successful family member. This is a 
product of Filipino culture. They view the family and the 
extended kinship group as the "primary focus of an 
individual's loyalty," and this is equally true for 
maternal and paternal extended kinship groups. 3o7 In 
addition, a system of ritual kinship called compadrazgo, is 
practiced. A non-kinsman godparent becomes a compadre by 
becoming the child's godparent at a baptism, confirmation or 
wedding. 301 The relationship between the godparent and 
godchild involves reciprocal obligations similar to those 
between true kinsmen, and business or political alliances 
are routinely cemented in this fashion. 309 The obligation, 
or "utang na loob," is not reciprocated in terms of a quid 
pro quo, but instead depends on the recipient's ability to 
307 CIA, General Survey, p. 127, as reproduced by 
Schirmer, The Philippines Reader, pp. 126-131. 
308 CIA, General Survey, pp. 127-128, as reproduced by 
Schirmer, The Philippines Reader, pp. 126-131. 
3~ CIA, General Survey, pp. 128, as reproduced by 
Schirmer, The Philippines Reader, pp. 126-131. 
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return a favor according to his/her means. llO This system of 
patronage relationships has spilled over into the political 
arena, so. that politics in the Philippines was not µnlike 
Tammany Hall days in the United States. 311 The CIA report on 
Philippine politica~ system stated that: 
Like allegiance to kinsmen, allegiance to 
political leaders became dependent largely upon 
debts of gratitude arising from the ability and 
willingness of a leader to confer benefits upon 
his followers. Democracy, however, added a new 
element; the followers could discharge their debts 
of gratitude with their votes, along with those of 
whatever compadres, friends, YJ} tenants they might 
in turn be able to influence. 1 
Goldstone's assertion is that Marcos used the money 
and benefits to reinforce the clientelist relationship, and 
further develop the web of personal obligation that 
neopatrimonial leaders rely on. There is evidence that there 
was widespread official corruption prior to martial law. 
The documents from the Symington hearings held in 1969 
before Congress were sanitized, but it was clear that there 
was widespread crime and official corruption that Marcos was 
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Marcos used official aid to enrich his friends prior to 
martial law. For example, four of the u.s. equipped 
engineering battalions provided to the Philippines as a 
result of the 1966 official visit to Washington were used by 
Rudolfo Cuenca to execute a highway contract that Marcos had 
awarded to him. 314 
During the martial law period, Marcos created his own 
technocratic class, and empowered his own close associates 
at the expense of the established professional class. In 
the process, he antagonized the traditional elite. Michael 
Armacost, former U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, 
comments that " ..• one source of resentment against Marcos 
within the elite was the fact that by perpetuating himself 
in off ice for twenty years, he had denied many the chance to 
get up to the trough. 11315 The President had extensive powers 
to influence the success or failure of any citizen or 
politician. 316 Unlike the situation in the United States, 
where being a Democrat during a Republican presidency does 
not personally affect an individual's success, business 
success in the Philippines is dependent on the correct 
314 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p.53. 
315 Michael H. Armacost, "Philippine Aspirations for 
Democracy" in Authoritarian Regimes in Transition, edited by 
Hans Bennendijk. pp. 296-297. 
316 CIA, General Survey, as reproduced by Schirmer, The 
Philippines Reader, pp. 129. 
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political affiliation. 3ll To support the liberal party when 
the Nacionalistas were in power meant taking a considerable 
risk. Martial law exacerbated the situation, giving Marcos 
a much wider control over the economy and thus the spoils 
system. 
The military which the United States had participated 
in training through JUSMAG and the provision of military 
assistance was used to enforce martial law, and was 
responsible for the arrest and detention of thousand of 
Filipinos. When martial law was declared, soldiers detained 
between 60,000 and 75,000, and reportedly engaged in 
kidnapping, torture and "salvaging. 11318 The Armed Forces of 
the Philippines had to carry out and enforce all 
presidential orders and decrees during martial law. 319 U.S. 
aid to the military was construed to be support for martial 
law and its excesses. The range of repressive activities did 
not coincide with the threat as it actually existed; the New 
People's Army started to grow in the 1980's, as a response 
to martial law and the fact that there weren't any other 
avenues open for protest or dissent. 
In the pre-martial law period, the Marcos regime 
317 CIA, General Survey, as reproduced by Schirmer, The 
Philippines Reader, pp. 129. 
318 Claude Buss, Cory Aguino and the People of the 
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benefitted from substantial aid as a reward for allowing the 
Clark Air Field and Subic Naval Base to be used as logistics 
and supply .centers during the Vietnam war. For example, 
after the 1966 state visit by President Marcos to the United 
States, the Philippines was promised $45 million in economic 
assistance, $31 million to settle veteran's claims, $3.5 
million for Imelda Marcos' cultural fund, and the previously 
mentioned engineering equipment for ten battalions. 328 The 
Philippines continued to receive substantial amounts of 
military and financial assistance. 
However, the biggest amounts came after martial law was 
declared. In 1973, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development reported that net financial 
flows to the Philippines amounted to $97 million dollars in 
1972 and $112 million in 1973, as opposed to a negative 
exchange $2 million in 1971, as capital flowed out of the 
country, back to the u.s. 321 Military assistance went from 
$18.5 million in 1972, to $45.3 million in 19 7 3. 322 
320 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p.53. 
321 Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Geographical Distribution of financial flows to 
Developing Countries (Paris: OECD, 1977), p. 186. 
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Philippines" and report submitted to the Fraser Subcommittee 
by the Dept. of State in June, 1975 and "Foreign Assistance 
and Related Programs Appropriations, FY 1973" presented in 
hearings before the Senate Appropriations Committee. They 
were reproduced by Walden Bello in "The Logistics of 
Repression." 
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Assistance continued at these levels through the 




the corruption was so 
economy. Since so 
rampant that it was 
much of the money came 
destroying 
from the United 
States, the belief that the United States approved of 
martial law gained legitimacy for both government supporters 
and would be dissidents. 
A staff report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations is perhaps the best indicator of the U.S. position 
towards martial law. Submitted in 1973, the report 
discusses the attitude of Americans in the Philippines. They 
were generally supportive of martial law for three reasons. 
First, Marcos had promised to open the economy in ways which 
were very attractive to investors. Second, U.S. interests 
were not perceived to be related to the preservation of 
democratic processes. Third, the general opinion was that 
considered to be deficient. 




there was also 
that martial law might lead a radicalization of the 
opposition since the only form of protest available would be 
violent protest. Also, the Nacionalista party already had a 
majority in both houses of the Philippine Congress, and 
therefore must bear responsibility for its ineffectiveness. 
However, what is most striking is the perception that the 
preservation of democracy was not coincidental with U.S. 
interests, and that the United States was pursuing a new 
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pragmatism. 323 Thus, while the United States did acquiesce 
to martial law conditions and provided considerable economic 
and military assistance, it was the absence of quid pro 
guos, in terms of reform, which dismayed the opposition 
rather than the increase in economic assistance. 
As was evident from the previous chapter, the United 
States and the Philippines have a history of close ties 
after independence. Also, the amount of U.S. presence in the 
country is much larger than in Iran, from U.S. corporations 
to the Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base. The bases alone 
employ approximately 15,000 workers, not counting 
dependents. 324 The presence of troops has provided 
employment, but Filipinos have always resented the sin 
cities which exist around the bases, Olongapo by Subic Naval 
Base, and Angeles by Clark Air Base. The important point 
here is that U.S. troops didn't come to the Philippines to 
make a profit but engaged in legitimate military activity 
allowed by the government. This presents a contrast to 
Iran, where thousands of Americans arrived to work at high 
paying technical jobs which the Iranians felt should have 
been theirs. 
323 Staff Report prepared for the use of the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Korea and the Philippines: 
November 1972, committee Print, 93rd Congress, 1st session, 
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Filipinos do not have a simplistic view of United 
States politics, or a monolithic view of Americans. 
Filipinos are accustomed to constant U.S. influence over 
their culture and society, and they do not perceive it as a 
malevolent one. 325 For example, the expressions of concern in 
1985 by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were reported 
and well received at a time when many believed the U.S. was 
supporting the Marcos dictatorship. 326 This sophisticated 
view, particularly among urban intellectuals, may have 
prevented long-term bitterness against the United States. 
Also, Filipinos during the 1970s and 1980s were able to 
organize effective opposition groups in the United States, 
and they were also reportedly effective in appearing before 
Congress and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
In terms of religion, the Philippines is a 
predominantly Catholic country, except for Muslims in the 
south. The role of religion wasn't significant during the 
tenure period, except that some radicalization of the clergy 
did occur during the 1970s, particularly with the advent of 
Vatican II and the formulation of Liberation Theology. 
Philippine Catholicism had been conservative, concentrating 
on spiritual and not material conditions. The number of 
priests affected who joined guerrillas or organized their 
325 Frank Denton and Victoria Villena-Denton, Filipino 
Views of America (Washington, D.C.: Asia Fellows Ltd., 
1986), p. 188. 
326 Denton, Filipino Views of America, p. 189. 
own groups to indoctrinate the masses was 






directions. This split is discussed in more detail during 
the analysis of the crisis period. 
IRAN 
Goldberg's framework doesn't fit Iran very well for 
several reasons. The most obvious is that from 1967 onward, 
Iran didn't receive economic aid from the United States, 
although it did host a Military Assistance Advisory Group, 
which attempted to assist the Shah with planning and 
utilizing military purchases and training, and continued to 
receive small amounts of military aid. The tenure period 
should be divided into two phases: pre-1962 and post 1962. 
Consolidation of the Shah's power occurred after he declared 
the White Revolution in July 1962, and it coincided with the 
acceleration of profits from oil production. 
In the pre-1962 phase, the Shah attempted to build up 
the military to reinforce his power. While he had taken 
decisive steps to crush the Tudeh party and considerably 
weaken the National Front, he still was in danger of 
overthrow. The head of SAVAK, General Teimur Bakhtiar, was 
sent into exile in early 1961 for plotting a coup against 
him, which he had confessed to Kermit Roosevelt and Allen 
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Dulles in 1958. 327 His other source of support came from the 
landlords, bureaucrats and entrepreneurs which formed the 
upper class and the growing middle class. 328 This led to 
problems such as the inability to tax the wealthy, landed 
aristocracy, since it was easier to raise taxes on staples 
for the working class. 329 The United States extended 
considerable economic aid to pull Iran out of the economic 
abyss that AIOC crisis had caused, and had also continued to 
cover Iran's budget deficits, which inevitably maintained 
the status quo. 330 By 1958, concern was growing about 
charges of corruption concerning the Shah's family and 
increased repression.331 Sam Bowling, the Deputy Director of 
Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs at the State Department, 
submitted a report to President Kennedy in 1961 which 
accurately predicted that traditional leaders, including the 
clergy, would provide dynamic leadership based on "the 
regeneration of Shi'a Islam," capture the urban middle 
class, and take over Iranian politics.332 
327 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 108. 
328 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 71. 
329 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 101. 
330 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 100. 
331 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 101. 
His 
332 Political Characteristics of the Iranian Urban 
Middle-Class and Implications Thereof for United States 
Policv: A report by the Deputy Director of Greek, Turkish, 
and Iranian Affairs (Bowling), United States Department of 
State to the President March 20, 1961, as reproduced by 
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recommendations included "dumping his family, or most of it, 
in Europe," as well as reducing the military, making 
examples of corrupt 
traditional elite for its 
ministers, and 
lack of social 
excoriating the 
res pons ibi 1ity.333 
However, without some type of crisis and further U.S. 
economic support, the Shah would probably have been unable 
to announce the White Revolution. 
The White Revolution's goals were admirable, and 
certainly impressed U.S. policy makers. However, the Shah 
failed to broaden his base of support, and ultimately ended 
up by mobilizing the rural population into the cities. In 
fact, he entrenched the elite by allowing them investment 
opportunities supported by heavy state investment, as well 
as opportunities for court patronage. This failure can taken 
in the same context as other developing states, and the 
problem of rural migration without the robust economy to 
employ new groups, mixed with rapid population growth isn't 
unusual. Also, growth of an educated middle class, which is 
denied economic opportunity through the dominance of elite 
groups is the rule rather than the exception. The Shah used 
severe repression, however, and was genuinely out of touch 
with how dissatisfied people had become during the 1970s. He 
had concentrated on suppressing the intelligentsia, 
supporting the military and traditional elites, and had 
Alexander, Iran A Documentary History, p. 322. 
333 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 328. 
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taken the countryside for granted, believing that the 
benefits of land reform had permanently endeared him to the 
peasantry. 
The composition of the elite groups was fairly static, 
however the salaried middle class which formed the civil 
service doubled between 1956 and 1977, 334 and the military 
grew phenomenally as well. The traditional elite in Iran 
consisted of 1000 individuals only, who owned many of the 
large commercial farms as well as many of the private firms 
in banking, manufacturing, foreign trade, insurance and 
urban construction.BS While the Shah had succeeded in 
creating an educated middle class other than the urban 
merchants, bazaaris and clerics, he was unable to completely 
dominate the latter group, and in fact gravely antagonized 
them beginning in 1975. For the former group, he didn't 
create avenues for political participation, but instead used 
SAVAK to make sure they wouldn't become a threat to his 
regime. 
The over identification of the Shah with the United 
States~ again can be looked at using the pre-White 
Revolution phase and the post-White Revolution phase. The 
Iranian perception was that the United States re-installed 
the Shah in 1953, and then provided him with both the 
economic and military wherewithal to consolidate his regime. 
334 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 434. 
335 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 432. 
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The economy was subsidized through economic aid and SAVAK 
was trained and initially funded through military aid. This 
is an accurate perception and was consistent with the goals 
of United States economic and military assistance. However, 
what Iranians do not acknowledge as easily is that the 
demonstrations leading up to Mossadeq's removal could not 
have been completely generated by the CIA; there was 
support for the Shah, and probably for anything that would 
end the economic distress that Iran was in as a result of 
the AIOC crisis. Also, Iranians deeply distrusted the 
Soviet Union and Mossadeq's inability to control the Soviet 
backed Tudeh party was frightening for many individuals. 
In the post-White Revolution phase, however, the Shah 
was increasingly less reliant on U.S. economic and military 
support, and promoted Iran as a regional superpower in the 
1970s, fully capable of bolstering United States interests 
while pursuing some rapprochement with the Soviet Union. As 
well, Iran was a leader in OPEC, forcefully pursuing Iran's 
interests in terms of oil prices and assuring access to the 
Straits of Hormuz. Yet the Iranians still associated the 
United States strongly with the Shah's regime, and believed 
that he was pursuing policies instigated by the White House. 
Part of this perception undoubtedly had to do with the 
massive arms sales which occurred in the 1970s. While some 
U.S. policy makers tried to impose restraint in terms of 
purchases, this information wasn't given to the public at 
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large. Also, the presence of thousands of wealthy Americans, 
whose wealth was generated by the arms trade, caused 
heightened Iranian resentment against the United States at a 
time when many Iranians couldn't find employment. On the 
other side, the United States could only try to encourage 
the Shah to be more restrained; by the early 1970s, Iran's 
oil alone was vital as the U.S. shifted into dependence on 
foreign sources of oil. Also, U.S. policy makers had very 
little understanding of the real conditions of the majority 
of Iranians. The failures of intelligence and embassy 
personnel to gather information is documented in the 
following chapter on the crisis period. However, the 
cessation of A.I.D. assistance meant that there was no 
longer a group of U.S. personnel who were actively involved 
in trying to improve the lives of the average Iranian. 
There was a huge discrepancy between Iran's wealth from oil, 
and the state of the economy and the condition of people 
living in urban slums or rural poverty. Oil wealth was 
diverted into military spending, industrial and 
infrastructure investment and corruption. As in the 
Philippines, those that surrounded the leader benefitted 
monetarily as oil wealth was used to reward followers in a 
patronage network. 
The final component of over identification involves 
Iranian culture and religion. First, there is a traditional 
national xenophobia which exists as a remnant of domination 
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by the British and Russians in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. The United States transgressed into interference 
in Iranian affairs with the re-installation of the Shah. 
This meant that for many Iranians the 1953 coup extended 
beyond their -0wn memory; for them, U.S. behavior was, with 
few distinctions, analogous to British and Russian 
imperialism. 
Second, Iran was and is a predominantly Muslim state, 
and Islam exists riveted to the perfect era when Mohammed 
lived in the seventh century after Christ. 336 Western values 
and customs were perceived with distrust, especially by 
religious leaders like Ayatollah Khomeini who advocated a 
return to an Islamic state. In Iranian tradition, as well as 
in the 1906 constitution, religious leaders are given 
authority to declare legislation void if it conflicts with 
Islamic principles. 337 Shi'a Islam differs from Sunni Islam 
in that there are certain principles set by one infallible 
imam and his descendants which are infallible. 338 Statements 
by religious leaders assume the importance of an infallible 
truth. The Ayatollah's judgements on the corruption of 
Western culture coincided with tremendous social and 
336 Adda B. Bozeman, "Iran: U.S. Foreign Policy and the 
Tradition of Persian Statecraft" in Orbis, vol. 23, number2, 
summer 1979, p. 387. 
337 Bozeman, "Iran: u. s. Foreign Policy and the 
Tradition of Persian Statecraft," p. 391. 
338 Bozeman, "Iran: U.S. Foreign Policy and the 
Tradition of Persian Statecraft," p. 390. 
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economic change, which forced people to rely on traditional 
religion as a focus for their lives. For many, other roots 
such as village or occupation didn't exist any longer. Since 
the main Western presence in Iran was American, it is not 
surprising that the Ayatollah identified the United States 
and Shah who was trying to modernize Iran, as the evil 
enemy. However, it took a decade of economic hardship, 
brutal repression by SAVAK and the persecution of the middle 
class before large numbers of students, outside of the 
religious schools would revolt. 
CHAPTER V 
THE CRISIS PERIOD: HISTORY AND COMPARISON 
The comparison of the crisis periods in the Philippines and 
Iran will focus on the U.S. response to regime failure and 
collapse. This chapter will 
each state. The concluding 
document the crisis period in 
section will explore the 
differences and similarities of the United States response 
to the devolution of power of President Marcos and the Shah, 
and the ascendancy of the new regime. 
THE IRANIAN CRISIS 
The revolution in Iran began with the riots in Qom on 
January 8, 1978, almost two years prior to the taking of the 
hostages on November 4, 1979. The factors which combined to 
cause the revolution had been present 
regime, however, it was during the 
throughout the Shah's 
1970 decade that the 
strains and stresses of heavy military 
state tactics used by SAVAK, and the 
spending, police 
mobilization of a 
growing middle class with no political outlet began to 
destabilize the country. 
The Shah relied on the military to support his regime 
and to establish Iran as an independent leader in the Middle 
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East. Given these two important roles, it is not surprising 
that so much money was spent in military purchases of 
sophisticated equipment and weaponry. The officer corps of 
the armed forces benefitted from attractive salaries, 
generous pensions, frequent travel abroad, modern medical 
facilities, comfortable housing, and low-priced department 
stores. 339 Despite this preferential treatment, the Shah 
purposely prevented the military becoming a threat to his 
own regime through several restrictions. The lines of 
authority were structured vertically, and the commanders of 
provincial military units had no direct contact with one 
another. 348 Permission to travel to Tehran or meet with one 
another had to come from the Shah directly. 341 Also, there 
were restrictions on the type of training allowed: exercises 
were limited to daylight hours, armed battalions could not 
travel more than 200 kilometers per year, and parade ground 
maneuvers rather than simulations were emphasized. 342 These 
conditions can account for the M.A.A.G.'s understandable 
339 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 436. 
34o Ann Schulz, "Military Expenditures 
Performance in Iran, 1950-1980: (Worcester, 
University, 1980, mimeograph), pp. 20-21 as 
Nicole Ball, Security and Economy in the 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 
and Economic 
Mass. : Clark 
quoted in 
Third World 
p. 4 5. 
341 Schulz, 
Performance," p45. 
"Military Expenditures and Economic 
342 Schulz, "Military Expenditures and Economic 
Performance," p45, and Ball, Security and Economy in the 
Third World, p. 45. 
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frustration at poor training and integration of the 
military, since part of the problem was created by the Shah 
purposely. 
In terms of the effect on the economy, military 
expenditures overwhelmed the Shah's budget, since he was 
also intent on pursuing ambitious goals in terms of 
modernizing the infrastructure and trying to build an 
industrial base. 343 A lot of Iran's difficulties are blamed 
on excess military spending, however, the Shah also pursued 
a policy of rapid industrialization, importing technical 
equipment and technicians. The rapid drive towards 
modernization made certain jobs obsolete, and people 
experienced a profound dislocation as opportunities 
closed. 344 Modernization was associated with the loss of jobs 
as well as the traditional way of life.345 The problem was 
exacerbated by unemployment, and the fact that the new jobs 
called for technically skilled labor, which was not 
available. Instead of a growing economy that could cope with 
a growing population, large groups lost ground. Wealth 
became more concentrated as the decade progressed. 
The most prosperous Iranians, who made up 20 
percent of the population,received 57.5 percent of 
343 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 183. 
344 An example is the use of plastic vessels to replace 
earthenware ones used for cooling. Once the source of 
livelihood for village potters, plastics made the profession 
obsolete. Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 268. 
345 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 268. 
the income in 1972 and 63.5 percent in 1975. The 
share of the middle 40 percent decreased from 31 
percent to 25.5 percent over the same period, and 
that of the poorest 40 ~ercent declined from 11.5 
percent to 11 percent.34 
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As traditional jobs were lost, people migrated to the 
cities which could not absorb them. The population of 
Tehran, for example, tripled in twenty years. 347 Also, 
although Iran's population doubled between 1962 and 1971, 
employment increased by only 23 percent. 348 The majority of 
the population was still illiterate, and untreated disease 
still caused major problems in rural areas. 349 More than 75 
percent of rural families subsisted on an income of $66 per 
month and malnutrition was widespread. 350 These socio-
economic ills were exacerbated by shortages and inflation. 
While the goals of reform were good public relations, the 
fact remains that sufficient investment in human capital did 
not exist to make them a reality. 
Also, the purchases of military equipment did not 
translate into more jobs for Iranians. The equipment was so 
sophisticated that it required a highly skilled work force 
to maintain it which Iran did not possess. Instead, by 1976 
there were 24,000 Americans living in Iran and without them, 
346 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 268. 
34? Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 268-269. 
348 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 143. 
349 Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.186. 
350 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.143. 
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the Iranian military would have been unable to function, 
since it could not maintain its own equipment. 351 Although 
Iranians and Americans worked well together, there was still 
resentment because the American standard of living was so 
much better, and it was believed that they were taking jobs 
from Iranians. 352 Most Americans lived in special subsidized 
housing, bought their goods at PXs, and sent their children 
to separate schools; despite their numbers, they made little 
impact on Iranian perception of Americans. 353 
While economic conditions worsened in the 1970s, 
repression by SAVAK also continued. The organization had 
grown to over 5,300 full time agents and an unknown number 
of informants, and it had the power "to censor the media, 
screen applicants for government jobs, and to use all means 
necessary to hunt down dissidents. 11354 In addition to SAVAK, 
the Imperial Inspectorate kept SAVAK under surveillance, 
guarded against military conspiracies and reported on the 
financial dealings of wealthy families. The J2 Bureau, which 
had been created in 1933 as part of the armed forces, 
collected military intelligence, but also kept an eye on 
351 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.137. 
352 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 137. 
353 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.137. 
354 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 436. 
SAVAK and the Imperial Inspectorate. 355 
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While the Shah 
relied on SAVAK to maintain control, he was obviously 
distrustful of the organization, fearful that it might seize 
power for itself. SAVAK effectively created a climate where 
Iranians were hesitant to become involved in politics, 
because it could be dangerous for themselves or family 
members. 356 
In 1975, Amnesty International determined that Iran was 
a frequent violator of human rights, and this prompted 
hearings, and these reports prompted hearings before the 
U.S. Congress. By the following year, the Subcommittee on 
Arms Sales concluded that it was potentially dangerous to 
sell weapons to a regime that was so repressive. 357 In 
response, the Shah allowed some liberalization and curbed 
the worst instances of torture. Three hundred and fifty-
seven political prisoners were amnestied in February, 1977, 
and in March the Shah allowed the International Commission 
of the Red Cross to visit twenty prisons. 358 Iranian expert 
Richard Cottam reported in 1977 that the Shah was improving 
prison conditions . 359 The State Department's 
437. 
355 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 436-
356 Saik al, The Rise and Fal 1 of the Shah, p .19 0. 
357 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 500. 
358 Abrahmian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 501. 
359 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.193. 
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congressionally mandated report on human rights in 1977 was 
fairly uncritical, referring to terrorist activity and the 
pace of economic and social change to justify the repressive 
nature of the regime, while lauding Iran for the lower 
incidence of torture. 360 
However, the Shah pursued policies from 1975 to 1976 
that punished groups which had previously acquiesced to his 
controls. The middle class bazaar merchants, for example, 
suffered widespread intimidation and controls during the 
course of a campaign to end inflation and shortages 
officially blamed on profiteering. The government imposed 
strict price controls and imported large amounts of wheat, 
sugar and meat to undercut local businessmen. 361 The Guild 
Courts set up by SAVAK issued 250,000 fines, banned 23,000 
traders from their home towns, sentenced approximately 8,000 
shopkeepers to prison terms ranging from two months to three 
years, and brought further charges against 180,000 small 
businessmen. 362 This campaign was executed against a 
backdrop of corruption at court which was widely known. The 
court could depend on lucrative salaries, pensions, and 
monetary rewards, and investment opportunities for the 
Shah's family and associates abounded, as oil wealth was 
360 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.194. 
361 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 498. 
362 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 498. 
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diverted for personal gain. 363 The Pahlavi Foundation, for 
example, received a $40 million annual subsidy, and operated 
as a tax haven for some Pahlavi businesses. The New York 
Times reported that the Foundation "is used in three ways: 
as a source of funds for the royal family; as a means of 
exerting influence on key sectors of the economy; and as a 
conduit for rewards to supporters of the regime." 364 
When Jimmy Carter was elected to the Presidency in 
1976, his stand on human rights and opposition to arms sales 
encouraged the Iranian opposition to hope that the United 
States would put pressure on him to liberalize the regime.365 
They grew bolder in calling for reforms, and openly 
circulated protest letters. 366 The Shah also believed that 
Carter expected him to liberalize, and he was reluctant to 
risk his relationship with Washington, because he still 
363 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 437. An 
example of this involves the Shah's family borrowing money 
from the state banks at favorable terms, reaping the profits 
from investments. Also, it has been alleged that oil revenue 
--- as much as $2 billion was transferred to secret foreign 
bank accounts. While the money transfers left no record in 
the state treasury, it did cause discrepancies between what 
oil companies paid for Iranian oil and what was documented 
by the government. 
364 A. Chittenden, "Bankers Say Shah's Fortune Is Well 
above a Billion," New York Times, 10 January 1979. As quoted 
in Iran Between Two Revolutions, by Ervand Abrahmian 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 438. 
365 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 500. 
366 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 501-
502. 
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relied on Washington as a source of arms. 367 Beginning in 
1977, the regime began to release political prisoners, and 
instituted court reforms promised to the International 
Commission of Juris ts. 368 The loosening of controls 
encouraged the opposition towards initially nonviolent 
protests; however, by November 1977, students were engaging 
in street demonstrations in Tehran. 3'9 
The revolutionary movement commenced with the riots in 
Qom at the beginning of the following year. Between six and 
/ one hundred demonstrators were killed in the January 9, 1978 
riots, depending on which accounts are credited. The 
demonstration was in response to an article critical of the 
Ayatollah Khomeini which had appeared in the government 
controlled press, and came two months after the death of 
Khomeini's son, who was widely believed to have been killed 
by SAVAK. 370 This started off a cycle of protests following 
the Shi'ite cycle of mourning which dictates a religious 
ceremony be held forty days after a death. 371 On February 
21st, riots broke out in Tabriz, where nine were killed and 
hundreds injured. The U.S. consul in Tabriz reported to Gary 
Sick, assistant to National Security advisor Zbigniew 
367 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.500. 
368 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 501. 
369 Abrahmian, Iran Between Two Revolutionsi p. 505. 
370 Gary Sick, All Fall Down, p. 34. 
371 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 35. 
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Brzezinski, that the rioters were young, unemployed, and 
that the targets of the demonstrations had been symbols of 
Western society such as social clubs and movie theaters. 372 
On March 29th, hundreds were arrested in Tabriz for rioting 
against the Shah and on May 11, demonstrations erupted in 
Tehran. 373 On May 15, a general strike was called by 
religious leaders; however, troops patrolling the streets 
prevented rioting.374 
The Carter Administration's concerns at this time 
didn't concern the instability in Iran, but rather the 
appropriate actions to pursue given the conflicting 
imperatives reducing arms sales and the strategic importance 
of Iran for the United States. 3" the debate centered around 
the Shah's latest arms request for F-4 aircraft, and whether 
they should be prepared for later insertion of sensitive 
radar equipment which had not been approved for export. 376 
Ultimately, the pre-wiring was not approved despite the 
Shah's insistent requests, and the debate was evidence that 
the days of the blank check policy were finished. 377 The 
Ambassador to Iran, James Sullivan, also travelled to 
372 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 35. 
313 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 206. 
374 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.206. 
375 Sick, All Fall Down, p.45. 
376 Sick, All Fall Down, p.45. 
377 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 45. 
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Washington that summer where he met with Brzezinski. 
Sullivan was preoccupied mostly with weapons sales to Iran 
which he favored, and was confident of the Shah's ability to 
deal with internal disturbances. 378 Also, the demonstrations 
in June had been relatively peaceful, probably because of 
the intercession of Ayatollah Shariatmadari, who was often 
at odds with Khomeini's more extreme views. 379 The timing of 
the demonstrations also lulled U.S. policy makers into a 
false sense of security regarding the seriousness of the 
demonstrations, and the Shah's ability to control them. The 
Shah would have understood the significance of 
demonstrations every 40 days, whereas U.S. policy makers 
would not. 
The Shah moved towards greater liberalization and 
political participation to calm the rioters. He chose 
August 5, the beginning of Ramadan and Constitution Day, to 
promise reforms and free elections in 1979 which would 
include the opposition. 388 On August 11, however, widespread 
demonstrations occurred in Isfahan, Shiraz, Ahvaz and 
Tabriz. 381 This was followed by a fire in a movie theater in 
Abadan on August 20, which killed 377 people, and rumors 
quickly spread that the fire had been started by SAVAK which 
378 Sick, All Fall Down, p.46. 
379 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 47. 
380 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 47. 
311 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 206. 
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had locked the exit doors resulting in the death of women 
and children. 382 The incident intensified government 
opposition, since most Iranians saw it as a premeditated 
massacre. 383 Meanwhile, the Shah's government continued to 
pursue conciliation. The Shah appointed Jaafar Sharif-
Emami as Prime Minister because he had a pious reputation, 
because he would be acceptable to the religious 
establishment, and it was believed that he would be more 
credible because of this background. 384 However, he was also 
elderly, ineffectual, and had been the head of the Phalavi 
Foundation which was the focus of suspicions regarding royal 
corruption. 385 Sharif-Emami attempted to persuade 
Shariatmadari and other clerics to compromise, but they 
demanded that the 1906 constitution limiting the monarchy be 
returned, and that Khomeini be allowed to come back into the 
country as conditions of reform. 386 The Shah's government 
refused both conditions, and pressured Iraq to expel 
Khomeini, who subsequently settled in Paris, where he 
directed events by telephone, cassettes smuggled into Iran, 
382 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 207. The movie 
theater fire followed five other conflagrations in the 
twelve preceding days, which had been set by fundamentalists 
opposed to sinful movies. 
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messengers, and the international media. 387 
By September, the Shah decided to pursue a crackdown 
policy, with the support of Brzezinski, whose views the Shah 
learned of via Iranian Ambassador Zahedi when he returned to 
I ran on September 5. 388 On September 7, between 700 and 
2,000 people were gunned down during a previously announced 
demonstration in Tehran's Jaleh Square, on what is referred 
to as "Black Friday. 11 319 Carter telephoned the Shah, 
expressing his regret at the violence and his continued 
support for the regime, while suggesting that liberalization 
should continue. 390 During the course of the conversation, 
the Shah reiterated his commitment to liberalization and 
democracy, while restating his belief that the 
demonstrations were instigated by a small group that was 
taking advantage of liberalization. 391 Despite the evidence 
387 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 213. 
388 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, 
389 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 214. 
390 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 214. 
391 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 51-52. The Shah had no 
record of this conversation with President Carter. Why the 
Shah forgot the phone call completely is open to 
speculation; it may have been his illness. Gary Sick 
believes that the Shah was either in shock or under heavy 
medication. Ten days later, the Shah met with Ambassador 
Sullivan who reported that the Shah was positive and 
determined, rather than depressed and indecisive. Sick 
believes that part of the reason why the crisis wasn't 
perceived as a threat was because rumors that the Shah was 
doing poorly mentally and physically were contradicted by 
Sullivan, and also because Sullivan never said too much 
about the Shah's physical/mental health to Washington. 
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that the demonstrations were increasing in number (as 
opposed to every 40 days within the traditional Shia 
mourning cycle), the Carter Administration continued to 
support the Shah, believing that he was trying to 
liberalize. However, the United States also attempted to 
remain aloof, refusing to intervene in internal political 
strife. Ironically, this did not convince Khomeini's 
followers of the detachment of the United states; the 
Ayatollah's mistrust of anything Western was too deeply 
ingrained to permit trust or compromise. 
Also during~this time period the State Department and 
President Carter were deeply involved in other foreign 
policy issues. The President was in the midst of the 
meeting with Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat at Camp David, 
and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was deeply involved in 
SALT II. As a result, responsibility for handling the crisis 
came to Henry Precht at the State Department, Gary Sick with 
the National Security Council and Robert Murray at the 
Pentagon. None of the three allegedly possessed the 
experience or the authority to express their concerns to the 
President as their supervisors could. 392 However, it was the 
Jaleh Square incident that made at least Henry Precht 
realize that more than unrest was occurring, and that the 
3' 2 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p.208. 
regime faced a serious challenge. 393 
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While the CIA kept 
reporting that the Shah's army could handle the situation, 
the State Department believed that the critical issue in 
Iran was the Shah's success or failure in convincing 
opposition leaders that the Shah wanted political reform and 
social justice. 394 
By the end of September, strikes over wages and 
political issues were commonplace.HS There were buying 
panics, widespread hoarding, and wealthy Iranians had 
started to send their money out of the country. 396 Prime 
Minister Sharif-Emami made concessions by closing theaters 
and gambling halls, conceding billions in wage settlements, 
promising a return to the Islamic calendar, permitting 
newspapers to be published without censors, proclaiming an 
amnesty which freed prisoners, and finally, by promising to 
allow Khomeini into the country if he would moderate his 
position. 397 Also the Minister of the Court Amir Abbas 
Hoveyda was removed from his position, prior to a conviction 
for practicing corruption in the court and government. 398 The 
Shah also allowed the switch of $200 million from the 
393 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 215. 
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military budget to pay for damage done by the riots and to 
compensate the families of those killed in the cinema 
fire. 399 He reportedly engaged in a painful reordering of 
priorities which downgraded military spending and 
modernization. 4oo However, at the same time, he increased 
military salaries by 20 percent to ensure the loyalty of the 
armed forces. 481 When these measures produced few results, 
the Shah pursued a more repressive course, with the support 
of Brzezinski conveyed by Ambassador Zahedi. 482 
The pattern in the ensuing months was that of greater 
liberalization, followed by crackdowns when more violence 
occurred. The reason for the pattern is two-fold: first, 
the Shah had alternately good and bad days in other 
words, like a lot of seriously ill people, his condition was 
unpredictable day to day, despite the fact that overall his 
health was failing. While these rumors reached Washington, 
embassy reports contradicted them on several occasions, so 
it was difficult for Washington policy makers to get a clear 
picture of how serious the Shah's condition was. 403 
Secondly, in retrospect, it seems obvious that incentives to 
compromise would have little effect on Khomeini, but there 
399 Sick, All Fall Down, p.56. 
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wasn't any way for the Shah to realize this at the time. For 
example, on October 26, 1978, the Shah granted amnesty to 
1400 political prisoners, but five days later, Iran's oil 
workers went on strike. At that point, Khomeini was the 
inspiration for the revolution which was acquiring further 
momentum. The Shah's actions were perceived to be erratic 
enough to cause doubts about his ability to govern. 404 For 
example, while he expanded martial law to other cities, 
ordered the army to take over the major newspapers and 
pressured Iraq to deport Khomeini after Black Friday, he 
also amnestied political prisoners and arrested former 
government leaders for corruption. 405 The speculation is 
whether this was a product of his illness, or simply bad 
crisis management; it seems evident, however, that the 
opposition wasn't responding to either carrots or sticks. 
From October 6 onward, Khomeini was directing the 
anti-Shah movement from Paris, becoming the subject of 
television, radio and newspaper reports. 406 Khomeini 
advocated anything but a gradualist approach, and he warned 
National Front leaders that they would be ejected from the 
movement if they tried to negotiate with the Shah. 487 The 
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U.S. had lost two opportunities to establish contact with 
the Khomeini opposition. Gary Sick rejected Professor 
Richard Cottam's request to assist Khomeini to leave Iraq 
for Paris (Kuwait refused him entrance and Iraq wouldn't let 
him return) 408 , and the State Department refused to meet with 
Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi, a medical researcher working in Texas who 
claimed to be Khomeini's spokesman in the United States.409 
It is difficult to say whether such a meeting, or timely 
assistance by the United States would have made any 
difference, but it would have established some good will at 
relatively little cost. At the end of October, the Carter 
Administration was still giving strong assurances of support 
for the Shah, praising his efforts at liberalization, and 
proclaiming its confidence in the Shah's ability to contain 
the ever growing violence and rebellion.no 
Finally in late October the policy debate began in 
earnest and more openly, with the completion of the State 
Department's report on Iran. The report's assessment of the 
situation was grim: essentially the Shah had only a few 
weeks to establish legitimate leadership, or he would be 
408 Sick, All Fall Down, p.57. 
409 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 57. Barry Rubin alleges that 
the CIA also tried to speak with Khomeini in Paris, 
establishing headquarters in a house near Khomeini's in 
Nauphle-le-Chateau, a suburb of Paris. They only managed to 
contact Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi whose monologues consisted of 
explaining the Khomeinist's moderate stance. Rubin, Paved 
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overthrown by the military.HI The report recommended that 
the United States follow a tripartite policy of support for 
the Shah, continued support for liberalization (to the 
extent of advising the Shah on domestic policy), while 
maintaining strong opposition to military rule.412 However, 
Ambassador Sullivan rejected these suggestions, recommending 
that the United States follow the opposite policy of quiet 
diplomacy, and supporting the Shah through his off ice, 
rather than with special envoys and advisors.U3 
The situation in Iran deteriorated with the oil strike 
which began on October 31, reducing the production from 5.8 
million barrels per day to 1.1 million. 414 By the end of 
December, production would fall to 300,000 barrels per day, 
despite Iran's domestic consumption of 900,000 barrels per 
day.415 Beginning on November 2, violent demonstrations and 
strikes affected the major cities in Iran, and in response, 
the Shah appointed General Gholam Reza Azhari as Prime 
Minister.416 The speech with which the Shah announced the 
appointment of the new Prime Minister was conciliatory In a 
strong contrast with his previous assessments, Ambassador 
411 Sick, All Fall Down, p.59. 
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Sullivan finally asked for instructions on November 2, 
intimating that the Shah might not whether the crisis.417 
At the Special Coordinating Council meeting later that day, 
it was decided, with Secretary of State Vance and President 
Carter's approval, to have Brzezinski instruct Ambassador 
Sullivan to express U.S. support for the Shah without 
reservation, whatever form of government he chose, and that 
once order was restored, the Shah should continue with 
liberalization. 418 Brzezinski also personally telephoned the 
Shah the following day to reiterate the message.419 
Gary Sick, in his book All Fall Down, discusses the 
decisions by U.S. policy makers surrounding the fall of the 
Shah and the split between the National Security Council, 
led by Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the State Department, led by 
Cyrus Vance. While Vance initially disassociated himself 
from the decision-making surrounding the problems in Iran, 
it appears that he did so because he agreed with 
Brzezinski's position of continued support for the Shah. 420 
It was left to his staffers, such as Henry Precht, to 
disagree with the National Security Advisor's decision to 
support the Shah as the best leader as far as U.S. interests 
were concerned. Sick writes that Precht's position made it 
417 Sick, All Fall Down, p.67. 
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impossible for them to work together, since every phone 
conversation deteriorated into long laments about the 
incorrect course of policy towards Iran. 421 Without Vance's 
backing, however, Precht couldn't go very far. 422 The 
uncoordinated effort between the State Department and the 
NSC came at a time when each agency and the President were 
overburdened with resolving other difficult foreign policy 
problems. There was only one Policy Review Committee meeting 
during the entire crisis which was chaired by Vance on 
November 6; at that time Vance and Brzezinski essentially 
agreed on a policy of continued support for the Shah, and 
the need for better intelligence on the opposition. 423 
On November 5, Tehran exploded with coordinated attacks 
on Western symbols such as foreign banks, liquor stores, 
cinemas, Western business establishments, and tourist 
hotels. 424 The British embassy was invaded and the chancery 
was torched. 425 On November 6, the Shah made a conciliatory 
speech acknowledging past abuses and promising reforms, 
while appointing General Gholamereza Azhari as Prime 
Minister to lead a military government. 426 Azhari was 
421 Sick, All Fall Down, p.70. 
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elderly and had a serious heart condition, but he also was a 
father figure for the armed forces, and there was concern 
because Khomeini was calling for the draftees to desert. 427 
This was a reality by the end of November, including 
soldiers as well as the homafars, technical experts who 
maintained the sophisticated equipment and who were capable 
of sabotaging it. 428 On November 7, the Ayatollah Khomeini, 
from his home in Paris, declared that an Islamic Republic 
would be established with force if necessary. 4" 
Finally, the embassy reacted to the accumulation of 
events which indicated that the Shah was losing control. On 
November 9, Ambassador Sullivan sent his famous telegram, 
entitled "thinking the unthinkable," analyzing the position 
of the Shah and other political forces. 430 Sullivan 
predicted that the military, which was comprised of 
Westernized officers, would reach an accommodation with 
Khomeini; the latter would need the military since it was 
crucial in controlling the country. 431 This would force 
Khomeini to moderate, relegating him to a Ghandi-like 
position with a passive and benevolent influence in terms of 
427 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 224-226. 
428 Many homafars had been held beyond their original 
contracts, and so had a legitimate grievance against the 
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investing the new government with his blessing. 432 This 
scenario proved incorrect because it underestimated 
Khomeini's ability and the appeal of his message. 
Sullivan's recommendations were not followed because there 
was no support by Brzezinski or Vance for supporting a 
moderate opposition at the expense of the Shah, and instead 
were interpreted as an attack on existing policy. 433 
Also in November, a note from President Carter to 
Vance, Brzezinski, and CIA Director Admiral stansf ield 
Turner was leaked to the press. 434 In it President Carter 
expressed his dissatisfaction with the intelligence 
reporting in Iran, and the issue quickly evolved into a 
general criticism of Turner and the CIA and forced a more 
general reappraisal of covert operations and intelligence. 435 
There were intelligence failures in Iran, and these came 
from the insular nature of embassy relations, as well as the 
restrictions which the Shah's suspicions placed on 
intelligence gathering. James Bill, an expert on Iranian 
politics, believes that the problem was the "incrustation" 
of the embassy. 436 He writes that 
432 Sick, All Fall Down, p. 83-84. 
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436 James Bill, as quoted in "Revolution in Iran" from 
Authoritarian Regimes in Transition edited by Hans 
Binnendijk (Washington D.C.: Foreign Service Institute, U.S. 
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American officials knew all the same people. They 
were talking to the educated middle classes. No 
one was ever really in touch with religious 
leaders. Not many Americans were in touch with the 
students. Americans did not speak with any of the 
people that are now running the government in the 
Islamic Republic. They didn't see the present 
ruling gro~ taking over; they didn't have contact 
with them. 
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The reason for this incrustation was the inability of most 
embassy personnel to speak Farsi, but also the all-pervasive 
presence of SAVAK. When contacts were made, it was 
difficult to know whether the individual was a SAVAK agent 
or not; 438 the Shah actively discouraged embassy officials 
from making contacts with those who disagreed with the Shah 
and his policies.439 Also, reports that differed from the 
prevailing perception that the Shah was fully in control 
were discounted, because they didn't correspond with 
assessments of the Shah as the leader of the regional 
superpower of the Middle East. When the revolution finally 
did begin, it took months for policy makers to understand 
the seriousness of the opposition, the character of 
Khomeini, and to realize that the Shah was ill, indecisive, 
and unable maintain his regime. Even as the situation 
worsened in November, the embassy communications spent a lot 
Department of State, 1989 ?}, p. 11. 
437 Bill, as quoted in "Revolution in Iran" from 
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of effort in explaining the "distortions" of local news 
reporting in favor of official accounts. 
Two special envoys went to Iran in late November to 
meet with the Shah about the crisis: Treasury Secretary 
Michael Blumenthal, and Senate Majority Leader Robert 
Byrd. 440 Both found the Shah indecisive and dispirited.441 On 
November 22, the National Security Council hosted an all day 
meeting on Iran, at which all participants agreed that 
December would be the crucial month. 442 Khomeini had called 
for the people to arise and unite, despite the ban on 
demonstrations. 443 The question was how the Shah would 
respond to continued unrest during a month of religious 
celebration (Moharam) which 
political confrontation. 444 
could easily evolve into 
As demonstrations and strikes continued, the United 
states worked through a policy dispute between Brzezinski 
and Vance. While Brzezinski advocated a hard line approach 
of supporting the Shah, fearing that any appearance of 
abandoning the him would destabilize other alliances in the 
Middle East. 445 George Ball, asked by Brzezinski to 
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undertake an analysis, disagreed with this assessment, 
perceived the Shah as a weak and indecisive leader, and 
believed that the monarch should be encouraged to set up a 
regency council encompassing players from the different 
factions. 446 Ultimately, Secretary of State Vance and 
President Carter disagreed with both Ball and Brzezinski; in 
mid-December, Vance finally weighed in, stating his belief 
that the Shah could not survive and that the best hope for 
the United States lay in supporting a prime minister chosen 
by the Shah prior to his departure, which would be 
acceptable to the opposition as well as the Shah's 
supporters. 447 This became the official policy, even though 
Shapour Bakhtiar, the Shah's chosen successor, was expelled 
from the National Front party for cooperating with the 
Shah. 448 
Despite the fact that Khomeini had dictated Bakhtiar's 
ouster from the National Front, President Carter made an 
overture to Khomeini in January to accept and support the 
Bakhtiar government. The first entailed a message asking 
Khomeini to support Bakhtiar in order to avoid bloodshed. 449 
Khomeini replied that Carter must remove the Shah from Iran, 
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and not support the Bakhtiar government. 450 The second 
overture was an attempt to arrange a meeting between the 
Inspector General of the Foreign Service Theodore Eliot and 
Khomeini; however, Brzezinski vetoed the plan even though 
the Shah had agreed to it, and it was proposed by Vance and 
the President. 451 Again, an opportunity for contact was lost 
due to a rigid policy of supporting the Shah against the 
opposition, excluding any contact which would have given the 
appearance of lessening U.S. support for the monarch. In 
one sense, Brzezinski was right, but for the wrong reasons. 
It was unlikely that Khomeini would have been affected by 
meeting with Theodore Eliot, since his position was so 
extreme. Finally on January 16, 1979, the Shah left for 
Egypt at the urging of the United States. He had been unable 
to arrange any compromise with Bakhtiar which would allow 
him even a limited exile. 452 December had been a month full 
of violence, strikes, and continuing attacks on Americans. 453 
This forced the Carter administration to finally support the 
Bakhtiar government at the expense of the Shah. The decision 
was taken during a National Security Council meeting on 
January 3, 1989. 454 General Robert Huyser was sent to Iran to 
450 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 240. 
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keep the Iranian military from either departing with the 
Shah or instituting a military coup, while the Shah was 
informed by Ambassador Sullivan, relaying a presidential 
memo, that he should leave the country for a long needed 
rest. 455 After his departure, thousands demonstrated 
joyfully in the streets, unaware that Iran was entering into 
a new period of political instability. 456 
The period between the Shah's departure and the 
severance of diplomatic relations between the United States 
and Iran was one in which different opposition factions, 
primarily the moderate clerics and the National Front party, 
vied for control with Khomeini's followers. Khomeini 
returned to Iran on January 31, and it was apparent that he 
commanded the loyalty of most of the urban population as 
well as the rank and file military personnel, who were 
departing in large numbers. He had already named his own 
shadow cabinet in France, designating Mehdi Bazargan as 
Prime Minister. 457 He was able to mobilize large numbers of 
individuals into demonstrations, strikes, and enforce the 
legitimacy of revolutionary tribunals; the latter had 
sentenced twenty-four individuals to death by March 5. 458 By 
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June, the executions total led 300. 459 After Khomeini 
announced that he supported National Front leader Mehdi 
Bazargan for Prime Minister, Bakhtiar's government lasted 
only until February 11, six days later. 460 It became 
apparent that real political power rested with Khomeini, who 
was not content with compromise of any type. He sacrificed 
one Prime Minister after another after they became too 
moderate, all the time "restoring" the country to an Islamic 
model. 
THE PHILIPPINE CRISIS 
The Philippine Crisis began with the assassination of 
Benigno Aquino on August 23, 1983. Aquino was returning 
from the United States, where he had received treatment for 
a serious heart condition. His objective in returning to the 
Philippines was to unite the opposition groups in time to 
prepare for the legislative elections scheduled for May 14 
as part of Marcos' liberalization after martial law. Only 
two months previously, Aquino had testified before Congress 
on the state of politics and repression in the Philippines. 
In contrast to previous policy, Aquino's assassination 
marked the beginning of a more concerted effort to challenge 
459 Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 370. 




the Marcos regime. 461 
While the Nixon and Ford administrations had been 
mostly concerned with the maintenance of Clark Air Base and 
Subic Naval Base, President Carter had expressed more of a 
concern for human rights. 462 Patricia Derian had made strong 
representations to the Marcos government, 463 but the focus 
was on violations of personal integrity, such as torture. 464 
By the 1980s, however, the NPA insurgency was growing and 
the economy was faltering as scandals of economic excess 
became more commonplace. 465 When the United States protested 
against the treatment of prisoners to the Ministry of 
Defense, conditions were occasionally ameliorated, but had 
little real effect on the actions of the Marcos government. 
Also, Marcos and his wife Imelda were personal friends of 
the Reagan's, and some allege that this factor made 
President Reagan reluctant to acknowledge the damage Marcos 
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was doing to the Philippines. 466 
After the Aquino assassination, however, the United 
States embassy effectively pressured Marcos in three areas. 
The first objective was to get a prompt and complete 
investigation of the assassination; the second was to 
encourage more precise procedures for succession, since 
Marcos was seriously ill with a rare disease, lupus 
erythematosus; finally, the embassy urged Marcos to 
recognize the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections 
(NAMFREL) which had been created in the 1950s by the United 
States. 467 The embassy also urged Marcos to create a fair 
electoral code, and to promote a more independent commission 
on elections. 468 There was only partial success: while 
NAMFREL was acknowledged, the commission on elections was 
not an independent body.469 
The embassy and the ambassador, Michael Armacost, had 
come to the conclusion that the Aquino assassination could 
only have occurred with the connivance of someone close to 
the succession. 470 Marcos was aware that Aquino's 
assassination would make him a martyr; ergo, someone who 
466 Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator (New York: 
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wanted to get rid of Marcos was suspect. One theory is that 
along with General Ver, Imelda Marcos and her brother Kokoy 
Romualdez conspired to kill Aquino; Marcos was so ill at the 
time that his death seemed imminent, and Imelda Marcos 
wanted to rule the Philippines after his death. 471 While 
Marcos blamed the assassination on communist insurgents, the 
embassy had been immediately sure that the Marcos government 
was involved. 472 Six weeks after the assassination, 
President Reagan cancelled his planned visit to the 
Philippines, apparently because of negative domestic 
reaction to the assassination; however, he also went to some 
lengths to pacify Marcos by cancelling the rest of his 
itinerary and writing a personal note to the Philippine 
president. 473 
While the Aquino assassination alienated Ambassador 
Armacost, the growing strength of the New People's Army 
further alarmed the Reagan administration. In 1984, the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations published a staff 
report asserting that the NPA would reach strategic parity 
with the armed forces within three to five years. 474 The 
potential threat was widely reported in the news media in 
the United States, which affected Congress and the Reagan 
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administration, who feared that the Philippines would become 
another Vietnam. 475 Moderate Filipinos were as reluctant as 
the United States to see the Philippines threatened by 
communism. Particularly the Catholic Church, led by 
Cardinal Jaime Sin, walked a fine line between acknowledging 
the desperate economic conditions affecting the majority of 
Filipinos as well as brutal political repression, and 
condemning those priests and nuns who openly followed the 
Marxist movement, believing in their own brand of liberation 
theology. 476 However, he did not condone Marxism or any type 
of violence. Cardinal Sin's involvement is important, 
however, because the Philippines is predominantly Catholic, 
and the Church has great ability to mobilize the population 
475 Fred Brown, "Creating the Environment for a 
Transition" in Authoritarian Regimes in Transition, p. 312. 
41 6 Liberation theology was a product of Vatican II, and 
holding that the priest had an obligation to serve the 
victims of poverty and oppression, and to address the 
salvation of their souls as well their temporal poverty. 
Particularly young priests believed that this justified 
social protest and agitation, conferring the right and/or 
duty to engage in social revolution. The Philippine Catholic 
hierarchy had traditionally emphasized attention to the soul 
rather than man's temporal condition; those who had been 
critical of the hierarchy quickly exploited the opportunity 
Vatican II offered to legitimize their views. Cardinal Sin 
was forced to appease both conservative and progressive 
elements; he refused to censure those openly sympathetic to 
Marxists, but also refused to condone violence. He took it 
upon himself to complain of military abuses, and even 
rebuked Pope John Paul II's criticism of his political 
activity by reasoning that since politics was a human 
activity, it therefore involved morality---and no one was 
better qualified to explain morality than a priest. William 
Chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution (New York: W.W. 




if it so chooses. Cardinal Sin successfully channeled 
protest into non-violent channels, and it can be argued that 
his actions prevented the radicalization of the Philippines. 
By mobilizing the church, Marxism was not allowed to be the 
only avenue of protest against the Marcos regime. 
The May 1984 elections were a further indication of the 
pressure on Marcos to make changes towards liberalization. 
The Aquino assassination had pushed the middle class, the 
Catholic Church, and the business community into open 
opposition to Marcos. 417 While both Imelda and Ferdinand 
Marcos spent a considerable amount of money to ensure the 
success of the Marcos own Kilusan Bagong Lipunan (KBL) 
party, the opposition won 60 seats in the 
(approximately one-third of the total)478, 
legislature 
and was 
particularly strong in Manila, much to Imelda Marcos' dismay 
since that was her province. Another setback occurred in 
October 1984 when the Agrava Commission, which had been 
charged with the investigation of the Aquino assassination, 
returned a report which concluded that a military conspiracy 
existed, although the commission members differed as to 
whether it included Chief of Staff General Ver, who 
commanded the military and was one of Marcos friends and 
477 Schirmer, The Philippines Reader, p. 275. 




close advisors. 479 
Also in 1984, a story was published in the San Jose 
Mercury-News, which won a Pulitzer Prize. It exposed the 
extent of Marcos wealth for the first time, pulling together 
what a lot of different sources knew about Marcos wealth and 
crony capitalism.480 
The Reagan Administration was still not willing to 
distance itself from the Marcos regime. A National Security 
Study Directive (NSSD) prepared by John Maisto, the head of 
the Philippines desk at the State Department, 481 opted for a 
policy of continued support for Marcos with an emphasis of 
pressure to make reforms and prepare for a peaceful 
transition to a successor. 482 The administration argued for 
the continued provision of economic and military aid in 
1985, and the Congress did authorize $70 million in military 
aid and $95 million in economic aid which would be sent 
through the normal channels in the Marcos government. 483 In 
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keeping with the new policy, however, Marcos received three 
visitors in January 1985 alone: Paul Wolfowitz, assistant 
secretary of state for East Asia; Richard Childress, the 
Asian expert in the NSC; and Richard Armitage, the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. 484 
Specifically, the reforms included the professionalization 
of the military, revitalization of the economy through 
allowing markets to freely operate outside of 
monopolization, and the continued opening of the political 
system, culminating in a presidential election in 1987. 485 
However, the embassy was not naive about the prospects for 
Marcos carrying out such measures, because it would have 
meant risking the fortunes of family members and friends in 
a market system instead of a monopolistic one, and turning 
over the military to people who might not be loyal to him. 486 
The eventual acquittal in December 1985 of General Ver and 
the other 25 defendants for the Aquino assassination seemed 
to confirm this belief, and it "tore the last shred of 
respectability from the Marcos version of the traditionally 
independent judicial system. 11411 
The Congress, in the form of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee had also become convinced that Marcos 
484 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 363. 
48S Armacost, "Philippine Aspirations," p. 301. 
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was beyond reform. In August of 1985, a committee staffer 
named Frederick z. Brown, who had travelled widely in the 
Philippines that year reported that Marcos was unlikely to 
reform and had successfully ignored U.S. pressure because he 
felt confident regarding the United States need for 
continued access to the Clark and Subic bases. 488 Also, he 
acknowledged that reforms ran counter to Marcos' interest, 
and that the Philippine president hoped to stay in power 
indefinitely, without yielding to the opposition or U.S. 
recommendations. 419 
The pressure on Marcos continued, with a visit from CIA 
director William Casey in May, followed by a visit in 
October by Senator Paul Laxalt. 496 Laxalt 's mission was to 
convince Marcos that President Reagan was serious about 
requesting reforms. 491 While the pressure may have been 
mild, it was another expression of the Reagan 
Administration's concern with the situation in the 
Philippines. 492 Finally, on November 3 via the television 
news program This Week with David Brinkley, Marcos announced 
that he would hold elections, and allow United States 
488 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, P· 379. 
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observers to monitor the vote. 493 This move has been widely 
regarded as a crucial error, for he was unable to find a 
pretext to maneuver himself out of the elections once the 
date was set. His motivation seems to have been concern over 
U.S. perceptions of his legitimacy. 494 
Cardinal Sin was responsible for convincing the 
disparate opposition groups to unite in support of the 
candidacy of Corazon Aquino. 495 As Benigno Aquino's widow, 
she already commanded great respect and affection; she also 
was an effective speaker, whose sincerity was evident and 
inspiring. Her campaign itself remains an interesting 
phenomenon because she didn't have the benefit of extensive 
television and radio coverage (all 3 television stations 
were operated by Imee Marcos, daughter of Ferdinand and 
Imelda).496 Her speeches were clearly heartfelt and sincere, 
speaking of the national and international shame which the 
Philippines had suffered because of the corruption 
engendered by the Marcos regime. She also had the support 
of the Church which proved crucial during the final 
showdown. At her final rally in Luneta Park in Manila, one-
hal f mi 11 ion people attended. 497 
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The election was held on Friday, February 7. Senator 
Paul Lugar, the head of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, led a team which observed the elections. Senator 
Lugar suspected fraud and said so early on, to the dismay of 
other members of the team. 498 At a meeting on Sunday, 
February 9, Ambassador Bosworth informed the team that they 
were reporting to Washington that there had been a 
systematic effort to limit the vote, and Lugar concurred, 
relaying that the voter registration lists had been purged 
of 10 to 40 percent of the electorate. 499 The team was in 
disagreement regarding how critical their statement should 
be of the election process. 566 What ultimately changed many 
members minds was the walkout, at great personl risk, of 
government computer workers who were tallying the vote 501 
They sought protection in Our Mother of Perpetual Help 
church, where they spoke with team members who came away 
with a different perspective.502 
The next drama occurred when President Reagan, at a 
news conference, commented that there may have been cheating 
on both sides, which infuriated Aquino and demoralized 
08 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 414. 
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embassy personnel. 563 Ambassador Bosworth personally met with 
Mrs. Aquino to diplomatically intimate that she should 
ignore the President's remarks, and that he would change his 
mind.~4 
On the same day as Reagan's remarks, one of Aquino's 
campaign advisor's was gunned down by six masked gunmen in 
Mani la. 505 This was reported in the United States, as was 
the walk out by the computer workers; Marcos himself was 
also given a lot of air time, but it did little to enhance 
his image. 566 The press coverage remained sympathetic to 
Aquino, and Congress started to openly criticize Marcos, 
calling for his resignation. 567 Both Marcos and Cory Aquino 
had realized that the American press and the American 
government were crucial allies, and both tried to bolster 
their image in the U.S. press by hiring American public 
relations advisors. 508 
However, the Filipinos didn't wait for Washington to 
adjust its policy; the Catholic Bishop's Conference of the 
Philippines published a pastoral letter which condemned the 
503 Buss, Cory Aguino and the PeoQle p.35 and Bonner, I 
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electoral fraud, and stated that the Marcos government had 
no moral basis because of these actions and called for 
nonviolent struggle for justice.~9 At this point, Reagan 
dispatched Philip Habib as a special envoy; he met with more 
than 100 individuals and came away convinced that Marcos had 
little legitimacy left and was able to convince President 
Reagan. 510 The White House issued a statement prior to 
Habib's return, however, which conceded that the fraud had 
been perpetrated by the ruling party. 511 
During the third week in February, everything finally 
unraveled for Marcos. In four short days, Marcos was routed 
in a nonviolent demonstration of power. On February 22nd, 
after notifying Cardinal Sin and the American and Japanese 
ambassadors, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and 
Lieutenant General Fidel Ramos demanded that President 
Marcos resign. 512 In an extraordinary two hour interview, 
Enrile confessed to committing election fraud, and that the 
assassination attempt on him which was the original 
justification for martial law never existed. 513 Cardinal Sin, 
meanwhile, asked Filipinos, via the church radio station, to 
509 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 425. 
510 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 430. 
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go into the streets to protect the rebels. 514 In response to 
this appeal, crowds surrounded the military barracks where 
Enrile and Ramos were staying.515 Marcos countered with 
announcing on television that he and the First Lady had been 
the targets of an assassination plot.516 The next day, 
General Ver ordered 500 men in tanks to attack the rebels; 
however, the streets were filled with non violent protestors 
from all different classes, armed with rosaries. 511 At a 
standoff, the tanks retreated. 518 The White House, now fully 
into the crisis mode, issued a statement which assigned 
"overwhelming" responsibility for fraud to 
party. 519 
the ruling 
As the crisis continued, more and more of the military 
joined the rebels. 520 By Monday the 24th, rebel helicopters 
had dropped grenades on the presidential palace, and 
attacked the government air base near Manila. 521 By six 
p.m., the White House issued another statement that was the 
product of extensive discussions earlier that day by 
514 Buss, Cory Aguino and the People p. 37. , 
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Reagan's chief staffers, including Chief of Staff Regan, 
Defense Secretary Weinberger, Secretary of State Schultz, 
National Security Adviser John Poindexter; Philip Habib and 
Michael Armacost, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral 
Crowe, and of course President Reagan. 522 Habib and Schultz 
were finally able to convince the President that Marcos had 
was going to be forced to leave. 523 Later that day the White 
House issued a statement that the United States would end 
military aid if force was used against the rebels. 524 Reagan 
also sent a message to Marcos to ask if he wanted asylum, in 
order to prevent him from facing the same situation as the 
Shah did, wandering from state to state. 525 On Monday 
morning, in response to an intercepted message which ordered 
the armed forces to attack the rebels, the White House 
issued another public statement calling for a "peaceful 
transition to a new government." 526 
On Tuesday, Marcos succeeded in reaching Senator Laxalt 
on the Hill, and asked Laxalt to ask the President if Marcos 
could resign when his term expired and then stay in the 
country. 527 Laxal t promised to check with the President, and 
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then called on Tuesday morning, unable to say what 
President Reagan wanted Marcos to do; in response, Marcos 
asked what Laxal t thought he should do. 528 Laxalt's reply 
was to advise Marcos to leave. 529 Shortly after 10:00 a.m., 
Cory Aquino took the oath of off ice as President. 53o In a 
grotesque parody, Marcos did the same at twelve o'clock at 
the presidential palace; however, the broadcast of the 
ceremony was knocked off the air as the rebels captured the 
last television station. 531 Marcos seemed ill and unaware of 
his surroundings. 532 Earlier that day, he had phoned 
Ambassador Bosworth, requesting a military escort to leave 
the palace. 533 At 9:00 p.m. he was taken by helicopter to 
Clark Air Base, where he boarded a plane, along with his 
family and General Ver, for Guam and then Hawaii. 534 At that 
point, Ambassador Bosworth telephoned President Aquino with 
his congratulations. 535 
Within two hours after Marcos departed, Secretary of 
State Schultz read a statement extending recognition to 
528 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 40. 
529 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 440. 
530 Buss, Cory Aguino and the People p. 41. , 
531 Buss, Cory Aguino and the People , p. 41. 
532 Buss, Cory Aguino and the People, p. 41. 
533 Buss, Cory Aguino and the People p. 41. I 
534 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 440. 
535 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 440. 
160 
President Aquino, in addition to praise for the courage of 
President Aquino and the Filipino people. 536 This was 
followed by assurances of military and economic assistance, 
and visits from Congressman Stephan Solarz and Secretary 
Weinberger. 537 
ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF THE CRISIS PERIOD 
It is interesting to note that the immediate events 
preceding the crisis period in each state were remarkably 
similar in some respects. There was a strong economic 
downturn which was in part a result of world recession 
(complicated by the debt crisis for the Philippines), and in 
part because of grave mismanagement of the economy. Both 
the Shah and Marcos had spent considerable time and effort 
in building up their military establishments, although the 
scale was much larger in Iran because of oil revenues and 
the Shah's obsession with arms purchases. In each state, 
corruption among the elite was a problem that was widely 
acknowledge and resented by the urban middle class. There 
was evidence in both Iran and the Philippines that 
corruption occurred to such a great extent that it damaged 
the economy and impoverished the average citizen. In Iran, 
there was further outrage at the waste of oil money which 
536 Buss, Cory Aguino and the People , p. 173. 
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could ensure prosperity for future generations. In each 
state, the military provided an important prop for the 
regime; however, military desertions were an important 
component in the downfall of each leader. Finally, each was 
forced to pursue at least 
was unable to enact real 
superficial liberalization, but 
reform because it would have 
endangered the centralization of power which maintained each 
regime. 
These commonalities notwithstanding, U.S. awareness of 
these conditions greatly differed in each country and 
affected the timeliness of the response which the United 
States was able to make. In the Philippines, the United 
States embassy had the benefit of being in a state where the 
opposition spoke the same language and was eager to meet 
with embassy personnel. When Aquino was assassinated, the 
embassy could accurately assess the importance of the event, 
through contact with Filipino leaders such as Cardinal Sin, 
and leading entrepreneurs from the Makati Business Club. 
Through these contacts, the embassy was aware of the 
strength and growth of the opposition, despite the limits 
Marcos placed on the press, and the extent to which martial 
law intimidated the opposition. Even with the typical 
Filipino attitude of "Bahala Na," which is roughly 
equivalent to "God will provide," it became apparent after 
Aquino's assassination that the middle class, large sections 
of the elite, and the military had become more predisposed 
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to take action against Marcos. In turn, the importance of 
the information which the embassy passed on to the State 
Department was accurately assessed by John Maisto, who had a 
personal connection with the Philippines. U.S. policy makers 
were able to jump on the bandwagon at the right time because 




is in extreme contrast 
had, for the most part, 
They associated with the 
to Iran. The embassy 
no knowledge of the 
same individuals who 
surrounded the Shah, and were unable to make contacts which 
would have given them a different view of the strength and 
depth of the opposition that was building over the years. In 
part, the limits were imposed by the sensitivity that the 
Shah exhibited towards intelligence gathering. The United 
States considered the twin benefits of oil and the 
maintenance of listening posts to the Soviet Union too 
important to jeopardize. Even if intelligence collection 
was attempted, the embassy could never be sure whether the 
contact was a SAVAK informer, since they were pervasive. 
Also, SAVAK's own intelligence gathering capabilities were 
admirable; people were frightened to say too much to anyone, 
because SAVAK had a way of finding out. All of these 
restraints combined to make reporting poor. 
This led to another deficit, which was an inability on 
the part of the embassy to judge the extent of the 
disruption which the Shah's modernization program had 
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caused. Academic experts like Richard Cottam, Marvin Zonis 
and James Bill were aware of the dislocation; but the 
average businessman, technician, or U.S. government employee 
had no means of judging the extent or the effects of rapid 
changes in Iranian society. While large slums are a good 
indication of poverty, it's amazing to realize that 
subsequent U.S. administrations from Nixon to Carter were 
unaware of the extent to which social mobilization and 
change had occurred. Perhaps if there had been greater 
involvement by A.I.D. or other U.S. assistance as there was 
in the Philippines, the assessment might have been more 
accurate. 
Finally, the embassy and the administration seemed 
unable to take the religious aspect of the revolution 
seriously. This was in part because they were unaware of 
the role that Shi'ism played in Iranian culture, but it also 
represents a type of chauvinism. While the resurgence of a 
militant Catholicism might be readily understood, the same 
commitment to Islam on the part of Iranians was somehow 
discounted. There was an assumption that modernization meant 
secularization; this may have been true for the people that 
the embassy associated with, but it was not true for the 
majority of individuals who were extremely disadvantaged. It 
was readily accepted by U.S. policy makers that Cardinal Sin 
could be mobilizing the population through political acumen 
and church radio, but the same credit was never given to 
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Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers. 
Another aspect of the crisis involves the perceptions 
about each leader, and when those perceptions began to 
change. In the Philippines, the U.S. Congress and embassy 
had an accurate idea regarding Marcos venality after 1984 
when the story regarding his personal wealth was reported in 
the San Jose Mercury-News. The consensus in the State 
Department regarding Marcos venality was echoed in Congress 
within the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Also, anyone 
with a passing knowledge of the Philippines realized that 
Marcos was the last in a long line of corrupt Presidents. It 
had become apparent, however, that he was possibly the 
winner in that contest; the scale of corruption disabled the 
state in its ability to serve even a small portion of 
Filipinos. 
In Iran the monolithic image of the Shah wasn't 
challenged until November 9, 1988, eleven months after the 
demonstrations began. Part of this was due to Ambassador 
Sullivan's poor reporting of the Shah's condition, since he 
was ill with cancer at the time. It was also a result of the 
cyclical nature of the demonstrations, which occurred every 
40 days. There were periods of calm which made it appear as 
if the Shah had the situation under control. However, the 
alternate policy of cracking down and then liberalizing 
should have indicated an indecisiveness which was part of 
the Shah's character. One of the valuable aspects of George 
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Ball's assistance during the crisis was that his perceptions 
of the Shah were formed prior to the Nixon/Kissinger era. He 
was aware of the assessments from the 50s and 60s which 
recognized the Shah's basic indecisiveness. 
Congress also was much more involved in the events 
which unfolded in the Philippines. Since economic 
assistance came up for review every year, Senators and 
Congressmen were much more likely to hear criticism of the 
Philippines. 538 Iran was under no such restrictions, and 
despite criticism of arms sales in 1975 and 1976, Iran's 
posture towards Israel, its role as a leader in OPEC, and 
the magnitude of the Shah's military purchases which 
recycled petrodollars eliminated a lot of criticism. 
Congress didn't appreciate the violence used by some of the 
Iranian students protesting against the Shah, and they 
didn't gain a lot of sympathy, unlike the organized and 
sophisticated opposition which Filipinos mounted in the 
United States. 539 
Still another difference involved the amount of contact 
which the opposition had with the United States. Although 
the Philippine opposition might deplore continued U.S. aid, 
they were also familiar enough with the processes of 
Congress and the executive, as well as the particular 
538 Hans Binnendijk, "Congress---Not an Important Actor" 
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character of each administration to recognize they could 
convince some if not all to support them. Khomeini and his 
followers, however, knew little about the political 
processes of the United States. They had a great distrust of 
the United States machinations in Iranian affairs. The 
opportunities for rapprochement were limited by the cultural 
limits of Khomeini's followers, as well as their lack of 
desire for contact with the United States. All envoys would 
be equally deceptive, pursuing an agenda that benefitted the 
United States, and thus could not be beneficial for Iran. 
Also, those who did appear to advocate a lessening of 
opposition to the West were executed, not unlike suspected 
royalists during the French Revolution. 
Another important aspect to compare involves the type 
of regime which assumed power. While both Aquino and 
Khomeini had great legitimacy, Aquino was a moderate leader 
while Khomeini was a radical one. Aquino was concerned with 
the practical realities of economic survival for the 
Philippines, which depends in large part on U.S. financial 
support in terms of trade and aid. Aquino didn't preach a 
radical agenda, but instead sought to return the Philippines 
to some type of order which would serve the majority of 
Filipinos, rather than enrich the Marcos family. Her goals 
of ending corruption and restoring political liberties were 
entirely reasonable. In contrast, Khomeini's goal was to 
create an Islamic state in Iran, and to do this he 
radicalized the population 
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through continued political 
uncertainty in the government. He successfully coordinated 
the rise and fall of four prime ministers after the Shah 
left, in order to consolidate his power and implement a 
theocratic regime. 
This leads to another aspect of 
character of each revolution. While 
comparison, namely the 
the government which 
triumphed in Iran was theocratic in nature, the revolution 
was a political one in the sense that a new group, the 
radical clerics, assumed power. Clerical approval and 
disapproval of government policies was part of Iranian 
political history, and with the revolution the clerics 
triumphed over all other secularized groups. Religious 
values became intertwined with ousting the Shah and 
rejecting the Western influences he represented. Embracing 
traditional Shi'ism was a means of reaffirming Iranian 
values and nationalism. The Shah was the symbol of the 
modern and Westernized Iran which benefitted few Iranians. 
The Philippines, on the other hand, seemed to return to a 
status quo where political elites contested elections 
between themselves. The difference was that the elite with a 
conscience finally came into power. The Philippines reacted 
against a particular dictator and his perversion of a 
political system that was already corrupt. While the events 
of the Philippine revolution were dramatic, it was truly on 
a different scale than that of Iran. These two factors, the 
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type of revolution and the type of leader, may partially 
account for the ability of U.S. policy makers to 




The analysis in this paper 
differences between the two states 
has centered on the 
during the tenure and 
crisis periods. It is evident that the United States did a 
better job of coordinating policy and coping with events in 
the Philippines during both time frames. Part of this was 
the result of greater familiarity with the personalities 
involved, and greater experience both in the embassy and 
State Department with the political culture of the 
Philippines. There was also a consensus to convince the 
President to "let go" of a long-time friend and U.S. ally. 
which united more individuals as the crisis progressed. This 
presents a contrast to Iran where policy coordination was 
difficult, information about the crisis was poor, and the 
President possessed no steadfast position on what action to 
pursue. Both the Shah and the United states found it 
difficult to cope with the revolutionary zeal of Khomeini's 
followers, believing that they would ultimately compromise. 
In addition to this assessment, however, some comment 
is necessary regarding the relative importance of the tenure 
period relationship versus the crisis management period, and 
how each affected the outcome of subsequent relations 
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between the United States and each country. Also, an 
important question in this paper is the asserted over 
identification of each leader with the United States, and 
how this affected long term relations after the Shah and 
Marcos departed. Thus, the conclusion will discuss the 
relative merits versus demerits of U.S. support and 
influence over each regime, and the effects of its concrete 
expression in terms of foreign aid reliance. 
TENURE VERSUS CRISIS 
In evaluating the tenure and crisis periods, it is 
difficult to assert that one is ultimately more important 
than the other in determining the varying outcomes. Rather, 
the tenure period set certain preconditions in terms of each 
relationship and created perceptions that affected the way 
each crisis played itself out between the United States and 
each state. 
The continuing good post-Marcos relationship between 
the United States and the Philippines is due in part to the 
weight of the past colonial relationship. Filipinos 
perceived their country in relation to the United States as 
a type of a special friendship between the two countries, 
and they valued it even though it wasn't perfect. The shift 
that occurred with the Aguino revolution was important for 
Filipinos, because they acted to oust a leader who the 
United States had approved 
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and supported with economic and 
recognition that the U.S. had military aid. There was a 
acted in its own primary interests by supporting Marcos, and 
not those of the Philippines, despite the special 
relationship. However, the United States remained a strong 
presence because the Philippines relied on U.S. economic 
support and the presence of U.S. military personnel on the 
bases. The United States maintains an ubiquitous presence in 
Philippine life which is difficult to comprehend from the 
other side of relationship. 
Also as a result of the colonial relationship and 
subsequent closeness, United States intervention in the 
Philippines after independence wasn't perceived as an 
absolutely malign influence as it was in Iran, although it 
was resented. While part of the Filipino political elite 
advocated nationalism and self-reliance, the group had a 
long history of cooperation with the United States. This 
pattern of reliance and cooperation established during the 
tenure period helped to moderate the Filipino response after 
the revolution. The Aquino presidency marked the assertion 
of Philippine self-government, rather than a rejection of 
the United States. 
Iran-U.S. relations were at the opposite end of the 
continuum. What U.S. policy makers generally knew of the 
Middle East in 
than their 
terms of culture 
knowledge of 




revolutionary policy makers, who were outside 
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the 
Westernized group around the Shah, the perception was one of 
traditional Iranian xenophobia towards a 
some moderates allied with Khomeini 
great power. While 
had a better 
understanding of the United States, this wasn't true for the 
average Iranian caught up in revolutionary fervor. The 
enduring 
the tenure 
perception for many Iranians, established during 
period was the Shah's overthrow of Mossadeq 
coordinated by U.S. spies. It was easy for Iranians to 
equate U.S. interference with British and Russian 
interference earlier in the century. 
In addition, the United States picture of Iran as a 
modern, Westernized regional power was created by the Shah, 
who successfully cultivated the image of an effective leader 
through bold foreign policy initiatives and OPEC leadership. 
U.S. policy makers were 
or challenge the Shah 
unwilling to alter this perception 
too greatly because of the benefits 
for U.S. foreign policy were too great. Iranians resented 
the well-known U.S. intervention in the 1953 coup, and then 
had to submit to increasingly severe political repression 
from SAVAK, which was trained by the CIA. Their pride in the 
Iranian state as a regional superpower was tempered with the 
costs of political repression at home and the loss of 
traditional ways of life as Iran rapidly modernized in ways 
that didn't benefit the majority. The infiltration of 
Western thought and lifestyle wasn't tempered with any 
173 
beneficial intervention by the United States, except perhaps 
U.S. intervention during the Azerbaijan crisis after World 
War II. In this manner, each side suffered from false and 
limited perceptions, and unlike 
relationship, there wasn't any residue 
the U.S.-Philippine 
of goodwill created 
during the tenure period towards U.S. involvement in Iran. 
The second observation concerns the change in leverage 
between the United States and each country. In a simple 
image, imagine a see-saw which is weighted on side A. This 
represents the United States, which prior to the martial law 
rule of Marcos and the Shah's declaration of the White 
Revolution, maintained a certain amount of influence over 
each leader in terms of reforms and other quid pro quos. 
This was expressed in the provision of foreign aid to fill 
budget deficits, and in the Philippine case also the 
continued maintenance of trade. However, both Marcos and 
the Shah managed to shift some of that weight towards side B 
as they consolidated power within their regimes. 
Increasingly, the United States percieved each man as being 
in control of domestic reforms and policies. This perception 
had the effect of making U.S. less willing to criticize 
internal developments. 
Also, some of the weight slid towards the other side, 
as the United States came to rely more on foreign oil from 
the Middle East and the strategic importance of the military 
bases in the Philippines increased. The United States found 
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Soviet presence in Cam Ranh Bay disturbing, once again 
seeing Soviet attempts at expansion. Iran was a significant 
oil supplier, but more importantly, the Shah was 
in OPEC, where Western states needed an ally. 
important 
Finally, 
changes in U.S. foreign policy outlook also allowed some 
weight to shift after the repercussions of withdrawal from 
the Vietnam crisis. The United States was no longer 
interested in making the necessary investments to influence 
events in other states, instead following a hands-off policy 
unless directly threatened. 
The effect of this cumulative shift in leverage was 
that the U.S. found itself over-reliant on Iranian oil and 
the Shah's leadership, and gradually lost the ability to 
influence the Shah towards reform. He no longer needed 
either revenue assistance or international political 
prestige; he only needed weapons and equipment, which it 
benefitted the U.S. to supply. Although it can be argued 
that even if the U.S. had pushed for reforms the Shah would 
not have pursued it, the perception of the United States in 
the eyes of many Iranians would have 
Iranian disappointment over Carter's 
through on his human rights rhetoric 
been much better. 
failure to follow 
caused a loss of 
credibility in the eyes of the opposition. 
The gradual loss of leverage during the tenure period 
affected the U.S.-Iran response much more than the U.S.-
Philippine response because not as much leverage was lost in 
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the Philippines. Partly this was because of the continued 
provision of foreign aid, but it was also a result of the 
long-term relationship that the U.S. and the Philippines had 
maintained. Also, the United States relied on Iran and the 
Shah's willingness to help manage a tempestuous region for 
U.S. foreign policy. These elements combined to create a 
greater loss of leverage in Iran. 
OVER IDENTIFICATION 
To say that military and economic aid maintained these 
leaders in power ends up as 
the relationship between 
an oversimplification. Just as 
economic change and political 
change is often indirect, so is the relationship between 
foreign aid and regime maintenance. However, the 
assiduousness with which each leader pursued foreign aid 
when the perceived need was there dovetailed with U.S. goals 
in the Cold War. Iran was out of the foreign aid reliance 
relationship after 1967, while the Philippines has never 
emerged. This probably accounts, in part, for the Shah's 
independence from the United States, despite the fact that 
he still needed the U.S. as an arms supplier. Neverless, he 
still remained over identified with the United States in the 
minds of many Iranians, even though his regime was 
maintained through political repression and oil revenues. 
Two facets of the foreign aid relationship with these 
176 
states are important and have bearing on the question of 
overidentification. First, it is alledged that foreign aid 
was used to further the political ends of each leader, and 
the United States used foreign aid to keep these individuals 
in power. The evidence in the Philippines is mostly 
anecdotal; there is acknowledgement that corruption was 
widespread, and certainly aid flows after the declaration of 
martial law increased. While Filipinos expected U.S. support 
of Filipino presidents, they resented U.S. support of Marcos 
during the martial law period. In terms of the Shah, the 
consensus is that U.S. aid supported the government and 
covered existing budget deficits at a time when the Shah was 
struggling to assume control, subduing the Tudeh party and 
weakening the National Front, allowing him the time to gain 
control and develop SAVAK. The point is that U.S. aid was 
supplied at a time when each leader was consolidating his 
power. While foreign aid continued on a long-term basis in 
the Philippines as opposed to Iran, this may not be as 
important as the fact that U.S. support ennabled each leader 
to stay in off ice long enough at a crucial point in time to 
centralize control around themselves. While large portions 
Iranians and Filipinos seemed to support each leader at 
these "turning points" it was continued U.S. aid that 
allowed them to consolidate their positions afterward. This 
is when over identification occurred. 
Second, the United States seems to have been unable to 
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influence reform in any significant way. The value of reform 
wasn't questioned and U.S. policymakers acknowledged that 
dictatorships were not a good long-term situation. However, 
the original end was to keep states from becoming communist 
as economic development corrected social inequities. 
Although each leader promised to improve living standards 
and create greater economic equity, they instead 
consolidated power, and elite groups became more entrenched. 
The United States had many ideas about the efficacy of 
foreign aid, but wasn't realistic about what was 
accomplished with it. While some conditions were 
ameliorated, the lack of change is the result of stated 
foreign aid goals such as economic prosperity and education 
clashing with the need for patronage and centralization. 
Thus foreign aid accomplished the goal of keeping each 
leader loyal to the United States, but fostered little 
internal political reform. 
FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS 
If recommendations for the future are in order, they 
center around U.S. attitudes toward Third World leaders. 
While accurate intelligence is vital to U.S. assessments of 
political change in developing states, so is the realization 
that no leader is permanent. Although strong support of the 
Shah bought support during his regime, there wasn't any 
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planned response as to what would happen if he should fail. 
The assumption that any regime is stable is simply 
erroneous, so an understanding of the opposition is 
necessary. 
Second, even if the U.S. is perceived to be supporting 
a repressive leader by opposing groups, U.S. pressure to 
mitigate the effects of regime abuses, such as torture or 
political repression, would engender more long-term goodwill 
with groups that might eventually assume power. The United 
States does have the leverage to do this with most states, 
and it constitutes better long-term planning. It also gives 
policy makers something to refer back to, and creates the 
perception that the U.S. is committed to the state, not the 
particular leader which governs that state. 
Finally, foreign economic and military aid should be 
used much more cautiously. 
efficacy of foreign aid 
Views have changed regarding the 
to create economic and political 
development in an ever upward spiral. However, the view 
that economic development and growth will foster more benign 
political conditions in Third World states still exists to 
some degree. Aid isn't politically neutral in these states, 
and it should be given with that understanding. As economies 
mobilize, a greater rather than a lesser concentration of 
wealth may occur. Concurrently, many elites may find 
themselves strengthened rather than weakened. Thus aid may 
have effects opposite of those intended, and U.S. policy 
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makers should be prepared for this outcome. 
For future research, it would be interesting to look at 
a larger group of states. By enlarging the sample, patterns 
may become evident which are not possible to observe with a 
comparison of two states alone. Another suggestion concerns 
the dynamics between the executive, state department, and 
national security apparatus in confronting crises of regime 
downfall in these states. Reactions probably vary between 
administrations, but the degree to which they might be 
similar would be interesting. Although it was beyond the 
scope of this paper, the Carter and Reagan administrations 
seemed to handle these crises quite differently. It would be 
interesting to note reactions among different 
administrations during different crises. 
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